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INTRODUCTION
An employee of a large corporation receives an e-mail from her
department manager. The e-mail reminds the employee about the
company's document retention policy, a reminder she interprets to
mean that she should destroy numerous files on a recent project.
This savvy employee, however, reads the newspapers and keeps tabs
on her company. She has heard about a government investigation
into a division of her company, and, although she works in a separate
division, she fears that the investigation may be expanding to include
some of the matters on which she has worked.' She also knows that
an investigation would uncover potentially problematic documents in
her files. After reading coundess headlines concerning corporate
crime, she fears that this "retention" reminder may actually be an ef-
fort to encourage her to shred documents in anticipation of a broad-
ening investigation-or worse, in response to an investigation which
has already broadened to include her division. Despite her suspicions
about the e-mail's purpose, she shreds several documents and deletes
hundreds of e-mails. An hour later, she receives an e-mail from one of
the company's in-house attorneys informing her that an internal in-
vestigation into certain irregularities in her department is underway.
Although the internal investigation is unrelated to any current govern-
ment investigation, the company's policy is to inform and involve gov-
ernmental authorities in the case of wrongdoing. The employee,
frightened not only by the prospect of losing her job, but now also by
potential exposure to criminal liability if the government becomes in-
volved, rips two pages from a "business diary." The two pages describe
her destruction of the documents. 2 Has this employee committed ob-
struction of justice?
I This portion of the hypothetical loosely parallels the state of mind that former
Credit Suisse First Boston investment banker Frank P. Quattrone claimed to have had
when he forwarded an e-mail to his employees to remind them of the corporation's docu-
ment retention policy. See generally Brooke A. Masters, Quattrone Denies He Sought to Foil
Probe; Cleanup Order Not Tied to Inquiry, Banker Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2003, at El
(describing Quattrone's claimed state of mind when sending the e-mail); infra Part III.C
(discussing U.S. v. Quattrone).
2 This portion of the hypothetical loosely parallels the probable state of mind of
former Freddie Mac President David Glenn, who admitted to ripping out at least one page
1520 [Vol. 89:1519
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Before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the an-
swer to this question hid amidst a web of overlapping federal obstruc-
tion-of-justice statutes, each requiring the government to prove
slightly different elements. Under these statutes, prosecuting this em-
ployee's obstructive acts would prove difficult. To varying degrees, the
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction statutes require the government to
prove that defendants have knowledge of the proceeding or investiga-
tion obstructed in order for that defendant to be found guilty of ob-
structing justice.3 Even courts that have broadly interpreted these
obstruction statutes to reach into the pre-proceeding realm still re-
quire the defendant to have knowledge of the particular proceeding
that was obstructed at the time of the act before the defendant can be
convicted. 4
The hypothetical employee above committed two acts of docu-
ment destruction with two different states of mind. This defendant,
however, may not have had enough knowledge about the proceeding
she obstructed in either situation to be convicted under the pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley federal obstruction statutes.5 In the first instance, the
defendant employee suspected and believed that her document
shredding and e-mail destruction might obstruct a investigation, but
she had no knowledge of the particular proceeding she was ob-
structing. In the second situation, although the defendant may have
assumed that ripping pages out of her diary obstructed an internal
corporate investigation that could possibly hinder a subsequent gov-
ernment investigation, she did not know that her actions would neces-
sarily obstruct a government inquiry.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 added a new anti-shredding pro-
vision, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, to the roster of federal obstruction-of-justice
statutes. The statute is drafted in broader terms than prior existing
law:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
of his business diary after learning of an internal investigation that may have sought the
diary. See generally Kathleen Day, Report Faults Freddie Mac Officials; Board Says Firm's Culture
Led to Transactions that Forced Restatements, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at El (discussing the
need for Freddie Mac to restate its earning statements); Julian Evans, The Secret Diay of
David Glenn, EUROMONEY, July 2003, at 6 (contemplating the content of the removed
pages); Del Jones & Eliot Blair Smith, Report Includes Pages ftom Fired President's Notebook,
USA TODAY, July 24, 2003, at 2B (detailing Glenn's admission that he removed diary
pages).
3 See infra Part II.A.
4 See infra Part II.C.
5 In one of the cases upon which this hypothetical is based, Mr. Quattrone's claimed
half-knowledge about the proceeding he obstructed led to a hung jury on charges of ob-
struction of justice under §§ 1503, 1505, and 1512(b)-the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley statutes
dealing with document destruction. See Part III.C.
2004] 1521
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investi-
gation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United States or any case
filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such
matter or case, shall be fined under this tide, imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both. 6
The provision does not require that the accused "corruptly" destroy
documents-a required element of several other obstruction statutes.7
Furthermore, the provision does not limit liability to those actors who
are facing a "pending proceeding" nor does it link the "intent to ob-
struct" element to an official proceeding. 8 Although the actor must
form an "intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" a federal investiga-
tion or administrative action, the statute includes the "in relation to or
contemplation of' language-which is unique to the federal obstruc-
tion statutes-to modify the mental state sufficient for conviction. 9
No court has yet interpreted § 1519, so the meaning of the broad
statutory language is not clear.' 0 Some commentators have dismissed
the significance of the new anti-shredding provision as doing "very
little to criminalize conduct that was not already criminal."'" Accord-
ing to this view, because some courts have given a broad reach to
some of the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction statutes, § 1519 reaches
no further than prior law. 12 Commentators have also argued that
§ 1519 may have little practical application since it would be too diffi-
cult for the government to show that a defendant intended to impede
an investigation without producing evidence of the defendant's spe-
cific awareness of the pending proceeding.' 3 For these reasons and
others, some have observed that "criminal practitioners view the new
6 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West Supp. 2003).
7 See infra note 289 and accompanying text (describing a letter from Senator Patrick
Leahy, the draftsman of § 1519, pointing out that the statute's exclusion of "corruptly" as a
modifier differentiates the statute from the other obstruction provisions).
8 See infra Part IV.B.
9 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-18 (2000); infra Part IV.C.
10 See Keith Palfin & Sandhya Prabhu, Obstruction of Justice, 40 AM. CuM. L. REv. 873,
874 (2003).
11 Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence As-
pects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 680 (2002); see also Palfin &
Prabhu, supra note 10, at 899 n.154 (noting that two new obstruction statutes, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512(c) and 1519, may be redundant).
12 See Perino, supra note 11, at 680 (arguing that that § 1512 already reaches obstruc-
tion committed in the pre-proceeding realm); Recent Legislation: Corporate Law-Congress
Passes Corporate and Accounting Fraud Legislation-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the U.S.
Code), 116 HARV. L. REV. 728, 731 (2002) ("[Section] 1519 catches only slightly more
conduct than the 'pending proceeding' language in 1505-such as when an actor destroys
or alters documents long before an informal investigation begins.").
13 See Perino, supra note 11, at 680.
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provisions and get-tough rhetoric [of Sarbanes-Oxley] as little more
than sound and fury signifying nothing."'
1 4
Unlike commentators, courts should not dismiss the new anti-
shredding provision as wholly redundant.1 5 This Note argues for an
alternative reading of § 1519 that draws from the congressional intent
of the statute in order to give it a distinct and significant place within
the panoply of federal obstruction statutes. This Note argues that the
anti-shredding provision can play a new and significant role in prohib-
iting anticipatory obstruction of justice-document destruction by in-
dividuals who are savvy enough to pre-empt an investigation by acting
before they have knowledge about the specific proceeding that may
demand the documents. 16 In the area of anticipatory obstruction, the
new Sarbanes-Oxley anti-shredding provision clarifies an area of ob-
struction of justice that has left the courts conflicted and juries
confused.
Part I of this Note examines the significant role that obstruction-
of-justice statutes play in white-collar crime enforcement. Part II ana-
lyzes the limits of the federal obstruction statutes used to prohibit doc-
ument destruction before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. This Part
14 JohnJ. FalveyJr. & Matthew A. Wolfman, The Criminal Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: A
Tale of Sound and Fury, 16 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1, 2 (2002); see also Geraldine Szott
Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55
FLA. L. REV. 937, 950 (2003) (noting "significant overlap" in obstruction provisions and
concluding that the "ultimate usefulness [of the new provisions] is uncertain").
15 The canons of statutory construction instruct courts to interpret statutes in pari
materia together, rather than in isolation, and they caution courts from construing statutes
so as to render them wholly redundant. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION: DECIDING APPEALS 523, 525 (1960); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003)
(stating that "the most rudimentary rule of statutory construction" is that courts do not
consider statutes in pari materia in isolation, "but in the context of the corpusjuris of which
they are a part" and interpreting statutory language to avoid surplusage); Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338, 344 (1945) ("[W]here another interpretation is wholly permissible, we
would be reluctant to give a statute that construction which makes it wholly redundant.").
16 While courts and commentators have not used the term "anticipatory obstruction,"
which this Note uses to describe preemptive obstruction of justice, the idea and term are
not wholly new. Practitioners have noted that § 1519 reaches culpable conduct earlier
than prior law. See W. Warren Hamel et al., They Got Tougher: New Criminal Penalties for
Fraud and Obstruction Affect All Companies, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 34 (concluding that
the "in contemplation of" language of § 1519 "substantially enlarges the scope of liability
for document destruction in advance of federal activity" codifying the "broadest standard
for determining when criminal liability attaches"); Abbe David Lowell & Kathryn C. Ar-
nold, Corporate Crime After 2000: A New Law Enforcement Challenge or Dffd vu ?, 40 AM. CRiM. L.
REv. 219, 225 (2003) (finding the ability to pursue charges of obstructing a "potential
future investigation" to be a "true expansion of existing law"). In addition, this idea has
surfaced in court opinions which link the "anticipation" mindset to obstruction of justice
when describing the mindset of actors at the time when they form a conspiracy to obstruct
justice. See discussion infra note 135. Finally, inchoate crimes have often been grouped
together under the descriptor of "anticipatory offenses." See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW 524-25 (3d ed. 2000); Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 1, 6
(1989).
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highlights two requirements that courts have used to limit the reach
of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction statutes: the "nexus" requirement
and the requirement that defendants have knowledge of the particu-
lar proceeding obstructed by their actions. Part III examines the inef-
fectiveness of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction statutes in the
courthouse by looking at juror confusion in two recent high-profile
document destruction cases: Arthur Andersen's obstruction-of-justice
conviction 17 and Frank Quattrone's hung jury. 8 Against this legal
background, Part IV looks to the legislative record of § 1519 to dis-
cern Congress's intent regarding the statute's scope. Part V draws to-
gether conclusions from case law, practical application, and legislative
intent to argue that § 1519 could play a powerful new role by criminal-
izing document destruction undertaken in anticipation of govern-
ment investigations. This Note contends that the government should
be able to convict a defendant for obstructive document destruction
under this statute even when it can only prove the defendant acted
with a generalized contemplation of official investigations or proceed-
ings. Under this interpretation, Part V explores the final question of
whether any constitutional boundaries would restrict how a court may
impose criminal liability for anticipatory obstruction.
I
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FEDERAL OBSTRUCTION-OF-JuSTICE
STATUTES TO WHITE-COLLAR CRIME ENFORCEMENT
Even a subtle difference in the state of mind required to convict a
defendant under § 1519 and prior federal obstruction statutes could
have a practical impact on the recent wave of white-collar crime prose-
cutions. Conventional wisdom holds that, for a variety of reasons,
prosecutors are quick to file obstruction-of-justice charges in cases of
financial crimes and complex fraud. 19 One possible explanation is
17 For reasons given below, this Note argues that the Arthur Andersen conviction was
an unsuccessful obstruction prosecution, despite the conviction obtained in that case. See
discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
18 Clearly this is not intended to be a representative cross-section. This Note focuses
on these two high-profile cases because the media attention created more of a record in
the press reports than less well-known cases. Post-verdict comments by the jurors to the
press in these cases, as well as the contemporaneous record of evidence presented through-
out the trial, provide some basis to analyze the strength of the legal theory presented to the
jury in order to draw conclusions about the strength of the law under which the defend-
ants were charged. In addition, both of these cases involve defendants who assert some
form of a claim that they lacked the requisite knowledge about the proceeding they
obstructed.
19 See Tamara Loomis, The Challenge of Prosecuting Obstruction Cases, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8,
2003, at 1.
1524 [Vol. 89:1519
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that because of the document-intensive nature of financial crimes,20
prosecutors jealously guard their primary source of evidence. 21 An-
other possibility is that the prospect of proving an obstruction-of-jus-
tice case may appear easier than explaining esoteric and complex
fraudulent schemes to a jury.22 There is also the belief that an ob-
struction charge is a powerful tool to convince a reluctant witness to
testify-a necessity in complex white-collar cases. 23 Finally, obstruc-
tive behavior also eases the prosecution's burden of establishing the
defendant's culpable state of mind-the most difficult element to
prove in prosecuting business crimes. 24 For all of these reasons, the
interpretation of the new anti-shredding statute will significantly im-
pact prosecutions of white-collar criminals.
It is difficult to either prove-or disprove-this conventional wis-
dom about the popularity of obstruction-of-justice charges with empir-
ical data. On the one hand, federal crime reports show that the
government rarely pursues obstruction-of-justice charges as a "primary
offense." 25 Those statistics, however, may underestimate the govern-
20 See MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME: LOCAL
PROSECUTORS AT WORK 70 (1998) (reporting a survey of local prosecutors who rank "a
search of financial records" as the most useful investigative tool).
21 Among others, former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt made this argument before Con-
gress when he reasoned that "destruction of documents cannot be condoned, because
once somebody gets away with it, everybody will try to get away with it, and the system falls
apart." The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Financial Services U.S. House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 95
(2002) (statement of Harvey Pitt); see also Tamara Loomis, The Challenge of Prosecuting Ob-
struction Cases, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 2003, at 1 (noting that obstruction ofjustice is a way for a
potential defendant to guarantee himself or herself an indictment because prosecutors
take the crime so seriously).
22 See Mary Flood, Snowball Effect in the Enron Case?: Andersen Indictment May Pay Many
Dividends to Prosecutors, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 19, 2002, at IA (noting that obstruction of
justice is among "prosecutors' favorite charges" and "often easier to prove than the under-
lying crimes and generally take a lot less time to investigate"); Edward Iwata, Obstruction
Charge Can Be Easier to Prove, USA TODAY,June 4, 2003, at 2B;Jeff Leeds, Andersen Juy Comes
to Deadlock, L.A. TIMES,June 13, 2002, at C1 ("[P] rosecutors consider obstruction to be one
of the easiest white-collar offenses to prove, in part because it doesn't usually require jurors
to understand complex financial details.").
23 Kit R. Roane, Andersen Clients Bolt-And Legal Risks Mount, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Mar. 18, 2002, at 34 (noting obstruction charges are often used to "spook people"
into cooperating with the government's case).
24 See BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 20, at 186-88.
25 Justice Department statistics show that 0.4% of all persons arrested for federal of-
fenses in 2000 were arrested for obstructingjustice. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, 387, tbl.4.33, available at http://www.albany.edu/source
book/1995/pdf/t433.pdf. The number of defendants indicted on obstruction cases is not
clear, but it still seems to be very low. The U.S. Sentencing Commission does not report
obstruction charges separately and instead groups obstruction-of-justice charges with other
"Administration ofJustice" offenses-including offense while on release, pejury, accessory
after the fact, and several other charges. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. A. (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANN
RPT/2001/AppA_01.htm. This group of offenses only constituted 1.8% of the cases
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ment's tendency to bring obstruction charges in conjunction with an
underlying substantive charge. 26 The Sentencing Commission reports
show that defendants in the federal system receive upward departures
for obstruction under guideline § 3C1.1 more often than any other
upward departure, which may support the notion that federal prose-
cutors routinely punish obstructive behavior in conjunction with a
substantive offense.27 However, the Sentencing Commission's statis-
tics may be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. They may include
defendants not indicted for obstructing justice, and they may not ac-
count for all the defendants who were indicted on an obstruction
charge.28 Furthermore, studies that have specifically examined white-
collar crime statistics often do not include obstruction-of-justice statis-
tics because the offense is not exclusively committed by white-collar
offenders.29
Although obstruction-of-justice cases do not flood federal court-
house dockets, they have dominated headlines,30 which may deter
more wrongdoers than the raw numbers of obstruction prosecutions
brought in federal court in 2001. Id. at tbl.3, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
2001/table3.pdf.
26 Where a defendant is arrested and indicted for two criminal offenses, both the
Justice Department and the Sentencing Commission only track the charge that carries the
longest statutory term. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2000, 597, app. 11 (defining "most serious offense" as "the offense with the greatest poten-
tial sentence"); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STA-
TISTICS app. A (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/AppA_0l.htm
(defining "primary offense" as the offense with the maximum statutory sentence). For
instance, a two-count indictment of wire fraud and obstruction would only count toward
the "fraud" category.
27 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.18 (2001).
28 If a defendant were charged with obstruction of justice, a court would face the
thorny question of whether it would be impermissible double-counting to enhance a sen-
tence that is based on the same conduct as the underlying offense. However, there have
been situations in which a defendant convicted for obstructing justice has had his sen-
tenced enhanced for obstruction. See United States v. Maggi, 44 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir.
1995) (allowing the enhancement of a sentence of a defendant charged with obstruction
and money laundering because the departure only affected the more serious charge of
money laundering); United States v. Fredette, 15 F.3d 272, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing
enhancement based on further obstructive conduct).
29 See, e.g., BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 20, at 44-45 (listing the nine offenses on
which they chose to survey local prosecutors in order to analyze white-collar crime; none
was obstruction of justice); Cynthia Barnett, The Measurement of White Collar Crime Using
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM NIBRS
PUBLICATION SERIES 1, 2-3, at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/whitecollarforweb.pdf (excluding
obstruction of justice from the list of white-collar offenses).
30 See Richard M. Strassberg & Roberto M. Braceras, 'Corruptly Persuading' the Obstruc-
tion of Justice, 16 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP., May 2002, at 1 (noting that obstruction-of-
justice prosecutions, while relatively rare, do dominate news coverage).
1526
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would indicate.31 The contrast between Arthur Andersen's swift ob-
struction conviction and the slow progress in indicting Enron's top
management exemplifies the idea that federal prosecutors file ob-
struction charges when the alternative is a complex financial crime.32
Martha Stewart's trial reaffirmed the cliche that "it's not the crime, it's
the cover-up," when she was charged with obstruction of justice 33 for
covering up actions warranting only civil charges of insider trading3 4
and a criminal charge of securities fraud that was eventually dismissed
as a matter of law.35 Similarly, prosecutors pursued the obstruction-of-
justice case against former Credit Suisse First Boston banker Frank
Quattrone despite the lack of an underlying criminal offense. 36 While
this disparity was particularly ironic in Stewart's case,3 7 the message
sent by her case reinforced the idea that hiding wrongdoing invites a
harsher punishment than the actual wrongdoing warranted. 38
The widespread use of e-mail has also increased the importance
of document destruction as a form of obstruction ofjustice committed
in the business office. E-mail has been described as "a form of almost
instantaneous communication ... [that] has replaced the wiretap as
31 See BENSON & CUJLLEN, supra note 20, at 95-96 (reporting a survey which found that
white-collar crime prosecutions are motivated by the goal of general deterrence, while
prosecutions of street crime are motivated by the goal of deterring the specific individual).
32 See Iwata, supra note 22, at 2B. In reports about the Enron scandal, federal prosecu-
tors have described this rationale as their reason for pursuing the Arthur Andersen indict-
ment before other indictments in the Enron case. SeeJeffrey Toobin, End Run at Enron:
Why the Country's Most Notorious Executives May Never Face Criminal Charges, NEW YORKER, Oct.
27, 2003, at 50 (quoting a government investigator describing the decision to prosecute
Andersen first as driven by the belief that the obstruction case was "easy" and "obvious").
33 While there were numerous charges involving Stewart's cover-up, she was charged
with both conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction ofjustice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
See Superseding Indictment at 38, 55, United States v. Stewart & Bacanovic S1 03 Cr.
171 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/
usmspbl0504sind.pdf.
34 But see Richard A. Booth, It's Not a Good Thing, But It's Not a Crime, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Feb. 23, 2004, at 13 (quoting the prosecutor in charge of the Stewart prosecution
who refused to file insider-trading charges because there was no precedent for doing so);
Warren L. Dennis & Bruce Boyden, Stewart Prosecution Imperils Business Civil Liberties, 18
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 3, 2003, at 2 (noting that the Department of Justice sought
obstruction charges against Ms. Stewart for hindering an investigation into insider-trading
allegations that the same Department ofJustice refused to charge as criminal "presumably
because they were so weak"); Brooke A. Masters, Stewart Prosecutor Balked at Insider-Trading
Charges, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003, at El
35 See Jonathan D. Glater, Most Serious Charge Against Stewart Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2004, at Al.
36 See infra note 240 and accompanying text (listing the three obstruction statutes in
the criminal indictment).
37 See Booth, supra note 34, at 13 ("The irony here is tremendous-Stewart is being
tried for denying that she did something that the prosecution agrees she did not do!")
38 See Strassberg & Braceras, supra note 30, at 1-2 (citing Watergate, Whitewater, the
Catholic Church, and Arthur Andersen as examples of leaders being brought down "not by
their own substantive wrongdoing, but rather by their efforts to 'cover-up' and obstruct
justice").
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the best source of incriminating evidence in white-collar prosecu-
tions. '39 In addition to being an invaluable record of the contempo-
raneous thoughts of a wrongdoer, e-mail is also more difficult for the
actor to destroy than is commonly thought.40 Deleting an e-mail from
an individual computer may still leave copies on the computer's hard
drive, the company's server, and the hard drives and servers of the
recipients. 41 The conviction of Arthur Andersen, the prosecution of
Credit Suisse First Boston banker Frank Quattrone, and the investiga-
tion of Merrill Lynch analysts relied heavily on e-mail evidence. 42 As
Mr. Quattrone quipped to the jury during testimony in his obstruction
trial, "E-mail is a medium that lasts forever and can come back to bite
you. '43 The widespread use of e-mail ensures that prosecutors' reli-
ance on such electronic evidence of substantive crimes and that ob-
struction-of-justice statutes' impact on white-collar criminal
enforcement will only increase.
II
DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION UNDER FEDERAL OBSTRUCTION
STATUTES BEFORE SARBANE-OxI.EY
The central question that determines whether and how anticipa-
tory obstruction of justice may be prohibited is how early a court will
impose criminal liability for destroying documents. Simply put: when
an individual destroys an incriminating document, how much must he
know about the proceeding in order for a court to find he obstructed
justice? The pre-Sarbanes-Oxley federal obstruction statutes have dif-
ferent requirements for a defendant's level of awareness. However, all
of these statutes are similarly limited in their ability to effectively pro-
hibit anticipatory obstruction.
39 RobertJ. Giuffra, Jr., E-mail: The Prosecutor's New Best Friend, Bus. CRIMES BULL., July
2003, at 1.
40 Id.; see also David F. Axelrod et al., Hard Times with Hard Drives: Paperless Evidence
Issues That Can't Be Papered Over, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1999, M-9-M-10 (1999) (describ-
ing the difficulties in purging electronic files); Tamara Loomis, Electronic Mail: A Smoking
Gun for Litigators, N.Y. LJ., May 16, 2002, at 5 (estimating that deleted e-mails are recover-
able approximately 90% of the time even though the authors do not consider them a
permanent record).
41 See Guiffra, supra note 39, at 1; see also Axelrod et al., supra note 40, at M-9 ("Backup
files constitute a ready-made store-house of potentially damaging material that is readily
available to a knowledgeable adversary.").
42 See Mark D. Walters, Electronic Evidence: When Misconduct Allegations Surface, E-mail
Proves Vital But It's Up to Companies to Handle It Properly, SEATTLE POST-INTELLICENCER, Oct.
13, 2003, at Cl.
43 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Banker Denies Intent to Obstruct U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2003, at Cl.
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A. The Limits of § 1503, § 1505, and § 1512
Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, three federal obstruction-of-jus-
tice statutes prohibited document destruction: 4 4 § 1503, § 1505, and
§ 1512(b). 4 5 Statutory and judicially imposed requirements have es-
sentially restricted the prosecution of obstruction of justice under
those statutes to defendants who can be shown to have knowledge of
the proceedings against them. 46 Even courts that stretched the lan-
guage of § 1512(b) to impose criminal liability early in the pre-pro-
ceeding area balked at imposing criminal liability where the
government could not prove the defendant's knowledge of the partic-
ular proceedings he obstructed.47 It is against this background that
§ 1519 can be considered a significant new weapon in the arsenal of a
federal prosecutor.
The "omnibus" obstruction provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, earned
the title of the "catch-all" provision within the labyrinth of federal ob-
struction statutes.4 8 The omnibus provision punishes an individual
who "corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice."49
The "catch-all" language was devised to prohibit a "variety of corrupt
methods [of obstructingjustice] ... limited only by the imagination of
the criminally inclined."50 To convict a defendant for document de-
struction under § 1503, the government must show four elements: 51
(1) a judicial proceeding which was pending when the documents
were destroyed (the "pending proceeding" requirement) ,52 (2) the in-
44 For the sake of simplicity, this Note focuses on document destruction. However,
§ 1519 prohibits a wide range of document-related obstruction, including the creation of
false documents, another expansion from existing law. See Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S.
Sen., to John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice 2-3 (Aug. 2, 2002) (on file with
author) (emphasizing this as one of the distinctions between § 1512 and § 1519).
45 SeeJAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 171 (1989); Christopher R.
Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice
Statutes, 8 FORDHAMJ. CoRnP. & FIN. L. 721, 729 (2003) (citing the three statutes as the pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley protection against document destruction); Strassberg & Braceras, supra
note 30, at 2 (citing sections 1503, 1505, and 1512 as the relevant statutes to document
destruction).
46 See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
47 See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
48 See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995); Palfin & Prabhu, supra note
10, at 875-77.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2000).
50 Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1949).
51 These elements are enumerated by Palfin & Prabhu. See supra note 10, at 877-78;
see also In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 317 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001). In the context of document
destruction, the documents' relevance and the defendant's knowledge of that relevance
are part of the test. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 175-76; Chase, supra note 45, at
731. However, the document's admissibility is not required. See GORELICK ET AL., supra
note 45, at 175; Chase, supra note 45, at 732.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 215 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Although it is
not mentioned in the statute, the Government must prove the existence of a pending
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dividual had knowledge of that proceeding,53 (3) a sufficient "nexus"
existed between the document destruction and the proceeding, 54 and
(4) the defendant acted corruptly and with an intent to obstruct or
interfere with a judicial proceeding or administration of justice. 55
While the omnibus provision applies only to judicial proceedings,
§ 1505 uses similar language to prohibit obstruction of congressional
or federal investigations. 56
Punishing anticipatory document destruction through § 1503 is
close to impossible. Logically, the requirements the government must
establish-the existence of a pending proceeding at the time of the
act and the defendant's knowledge of that proceeding-foreclose a
prosecutor's ability to indict a defendant for obstructive acts that oc-
cur merely in anticipation of a future proceeding.57 In addition, the
Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Aguilar,58 requiring a sufficient
"nexus" between the obstruction and the proceeding, may have fur-
ther restricted the scope § 1503 in combating anticipatory obstruc-
tion.59 Perhaps because of the difficulties in proving these elements,
courts have interpreted other obstruction statutes less restrictively.
The omnibus bill's companion statute, § 1505, uses the same lan-
guage as § 1503 to prohibit actions taken with the intent to obstruct
"any pending proceeding.., before any department or agency of the
United States." 60 Thus, § 1505 prohibits document destruction like
§ 1503,61 but targets obstruction that is directed at agency and con-
gressional investigations, as well as adjudicative functions undertaken
judicial proceeding in a prosecution for a violation of § 1503."); United States v. Cihak, 137
F.3d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In order for the government to prove obstruction ofjustice
and conspiracy to obstruct justice, there must have existed a pending judicial proceeding
at the time that defendants acted.").
53 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 197
F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999) ("In order to violate § 1503, a defendant must have notice or
knowledge of the pendency of some judicial proceeding constituting the 'administration of
justice."' (citing United States v. Nelson, 852 F.2d 706, 710 (3d Cir. 1998))); United States
v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 650-51 (1st Cir. 1996) (reversing a § 1503 conviction because
the defendant only had knowledge of an investigation; he lacked knowledge that the inves-
tigation was part of a grand jury proceeding).
54 See infra Part II.B.1.
55 See, e.g., United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that a
conviction under § 1503 requires a specific intent to obstruct justice; knowledge alone will
not suffice); see also United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (distin-
guishing between knowledge of the obstructed proceeding and specific intent to obstruct).
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000); infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
57 GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 176-83.
58 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
59 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
61 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 185; Palfin & Prabhu, supra note 10, at 889
("Section 1505 ... makes criminal much of the same behavior, but is applicable to pro-
ceedings before federal agencies.").
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by those government entities.62 Like the omnibus provision, § 1505
ties the obstructive act to a pending proceeding and requires knowl-
edge of that proceeding.63 However, the "pending proceeding" re-
quirement under § 1505 is more broadly construed than the
requirement under § 1503, allowing convictions when the obstructive
acts occur in the preliminary, investigative stages of the case. 64 The
Aguilar "nexus" requirement seems to apply to § 1505, as courts facing
the issue have not distinguished the two statutes with regard to that
requirement. 65 While knowledge of the pending proceeding is re-
quired under § 1505, it is unclear if a general belief about the pro-
ceeding to be obstructed, rather than knowledge about a specific
pending proceeding, would suffice. 66
Can § 1505 be used to prohibit anticipatory obstruction of jus-
tice? Courts have interpreted § 1505 to prohibit obstructive acts oc-
curring much earlier in the criminal storyline than covered under the
omnibus provision. 67 However, courts also require the government to
establish that the defendant was aware of a pending proceeding
before being convicted under § 1505.68 Courts have not broadened
that awareness to include merely a generalized contemplation of an
investigation. In addition, the linguistic similarity to § 1503 makes it
more likely that courts may require the government to show a proper
"nexus" between the obstructive act and the proceeding. Thus, even
62 See United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d. 755, 761 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that an
SEC investigation is a "pending proceeding," even though SEC may only enforce orders
through the courts); United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 1998); Chase,
supra note 45, at 736.
63 See United States v. Price, 951 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he defendant
must be aware of the pending proceeding"); Chase, supra note 45, at 737; Palfin & Prabhu,
supra note 10, at 889; see, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984).
64 See Senffner, 280 F.3d. at 760; United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding that a collection of delinquent taxes by the United States Marshal is an IRS
"proceeding"); United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that
interviews with customs officials qualify as pending agency proceedings); United States v.
Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying § 1505 where defendant obstructed
the investigation of a defense audit agency).
65 See United States v. Jacques Dessange, Inc., 4 Fed. Appx. 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2001)
("Assuming that the nexus requirement announced in Aguilar applies to § 1505 prosecu-
tions, the jury could reasonably conclude that it was satisfied here."); Hopper, 177 F.3d at
830 (applying the Aguilar nexus requirement in a § 1505 prosecution); see also United
States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1250 & n.24 (lth Cir. 1998) (distinguishing the nexus re-
quirement of § 1503 and § 1512 based on federal interest and noting that the federal inter-
est at stake in § 1505 would indicate that the nexus requirement applies).
66 See Chase, supra note 45, at 737 ("It is unclear whether actual notice is required or
whether likely suspicion of a proceeding is sufficient for this requirement."). See generally
Strassberg & Braceras, supra note 30, at 2 (arguing that the rarity of obstruction-of-justice
cases and the overlapping nature of the statutes leads to ambiguity and conflict in the case
law which is challenging for even an experienced practitioner).
67 GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 186-87.
68 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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though the reach of § 1505 is less clear than that of § 1503 or § 1512,
there are still potential obstacles for prosecutors to overcome before
using the statute to charge a defendant for obstructing justice in antic-
ipation of an agency investigation or proceeding.
The document destruction provision of the witness-tampering
statute, § 1512(b), has a broad reach into the preliminary, investiga-
tive stages of law enforcement. 69 The statute targets an individual who
"knowingly[,] ... corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to
do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with
intent to... alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent
to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official pro-
ceeding. ' 70  In order for a defendant to be convicted under
§ 1512(b), the government must show: 7' (1) that the defendant know-
ingly, 72 (2) corruptly persuaded another to destroy documents, 73 (3)
with intent to influence or obstruct an official proceeding. 74 While
the statute ties the defendant's obstructive intent to "an official pro-
ceeding," this term includes investigations just like § 1505. 7 5 In addi-
tion, a subsection of the statute specifies that "an official proceeding
need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the of-
fense." 76 Since the specificity of the defendant's knowledge of the of-
ficial proceeding is unsettled under § 1512, 77 the government is not
69 See United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1991);John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., The Andersen Fiasco, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A19 (noting that courts have read
the statute to "reach conduct that occurs during an informal investigatory stage").
70 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2) (B) (2000).
71 For the elements see GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 189; Chase, supra note 45, at
739; Palfin & Prabhu, supra note 10, at 893.
72 See United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing the
defendant acting "knowingly" as the first element of obstruction of justice under § 1512);
United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 650-51 (1st Cir. 1996) (describing the defen-
dant acting "knowingly" as the first element of obstruction of justice in a document de-
struction case under § 1512(b)).
73 See United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the
"corruptly persuades" requirement to include non-coercive persuasion); United States v.
Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the accused need only "corruptly
persuade" another person under § 1512; that other person does not need to be the actual
witness); United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting an
intransitive use of "corruptly persuades"-"wickedly" or "immorally"-as void for vague-
ness, though allowing for the transitive use of the phrase).
74 See Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1100-01 (upholding the grant of a new trial where prose-
cution asked the jury to infer intent to obstruct justice from "common sense"); United
States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (distinguishing the intent element of
§ 1512 from § 1503).
75 See Frankhauser, 80 F.3d at 652 (finding defendants' interference with an FBI inves-
tigation was an obstruction of an official proceeding); United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118,
1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding an investigation by the Office of the Inspector General of
the U.S. Agency for International Development is an "official proceeding" for purposes of
§ 1512); Palfin & Prabhu, supra note 10, at 897-98.
76 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(f)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
77 See discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
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required to prove the defendant's state of mind regarding the federal
nature of the proceeding. 7 Although it is not settled law, some courts
distinguish § 1512(b) from § 1503 and refuse to require the Aguilar
nexus under § 1512(b). 79
Because § 1512 eases the requirements that the government must
fulfill, prosecutions under this statute are so common that the witness-
tampering law "has become the predominant obstruction-of-justice
statute."8 0 It has proven to be effective in some high-profile cases,
such as Arthur Andersen. 8' In fact, there is some debate about
whether § 1512 has supplanted § 1503, so that the witness-tampering
statute is now the exclusive tool for prosecuting the forms of obstruc-
tion of justice enumerated in the statute. 8 2 Because § 1512(b) was
written as a witness-tampering statute, it initially criminalized only the
attempt to persuade another person to destroy documents and did
not apply to the document shredders themselves.8 3 Congress cor-
rected this disparity in the Sarbanes-Oxley bill by adding a new sec-
tion, § 1512(c), which uses the language of § 1512(b) to punish the
actor who destroys documents as well.84
Despite the ways in which § 1512(b) may ease a prosecutor's bur-
den, the witness-tampering statute is still inadequate to effectively pro-
hibit anticipatory obstruction. Courts have found that a conviction
under § 1512(b) still requires the government to show the defen-
dant's knowledge of an official proceeding. 8 5 As explored below,
some courts have taken the statutory requirement, "with intent to im-
pair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceed-
ing," to mean that a defendant who obstructs justice must be acting
with knowledge of a specific investigation before he may be convicted
under the statute.8 6 Without an active proceeding against the defen-
78 See United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Ap-
plewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054
(2d Cir. 1991).
79 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. But seeJonathan D. Polkes, Obstruction ofJustice Nexus
Requirement Unclear in New Statutes, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003, at 7 (arguing that a nexus require-
ment could be read into both § 1512 and § 1519).
80 Strassberg & Braceras, supra note 30, at 3 (citing the statistic that, of cases brought
under § 1503, § 1505, and § 1512 between 1995 and 2000, between 58-75% of the prose-
cutions were brought under § 1512).
81 See Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen, 2002 WL 32153945 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 14, 2002) (No. 02-121); Part III.A-B.
82 See Tina M. Riley, Note, Tampering with Witness Tampering: Resolving the Quandary
Surrounding § 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 249, 275 (1999).
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000).
84 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp. 2003); Chase, supra note 45, at 741 ("[W]hat
was seen as a technical distinction (punishing the persuader only) burdening prosecutors
has now been lifted with the inclusion of language to prosecute the document destroyer
himself.").
85 See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
86 See discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
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dant, the government's attempt to prove an intent to prevent a docu-
ment's availability for "an official proceeding" becomes complicated.
When courts consider the scope of the new anti-shredding provi-
sion, they may examine the jurisprudence surrounding these other
federal obstruction statutes and ask whether the limitations of those
statutes should also apply to § 1519. The central question of "antici-
patory" obstruction is whether the government is able to prohibit de-
struction of documents undertaken by an actor who, at the time of the
act, had only general knowledge about the proceeding he sought to
obstruct. Requiring that a defendant know about a proceeding before
he obstructs serves two basic purposes. First, the requirement gives
the actor fair notice that he is crossing the line from permissible to
impermissible conduct. Second, it ensures that the defendant actually
forms the required intent to obstruct justice. In the area of anticipa-
tory obstruction, these rationales conflict. The anticipatory document
shredder acts intentionally to obstruct justice, but does so before
there is a clear demarcation to which courts would normally point to
show the accused received notice that his activities were prohibited-
the government subpoena, an internal memo, the start of an investiga-
tion, or an indictment.
This leaves the courts with three possible answers to the central
question of how § 1519 can be used to prohibit anticipatory obstruc-
tion. First, courts could find that § 1519 applies only where the ob-
structive act and the proceeding are linked by a "nexus" that is
currently required only of obstruction-of-justice charges brought
under § 1503. The nexus requirement is driven by the concern that
defendants have enough knowledge of the obstructed proceeding that
they have "fair notice" their actions are proscribed. 7 Second, courts
could follow a line of cases under § 1512 (b) which require the govern-
ment to show the defendant's knowledge about a particular proceed-
ing in order to establish their intent to obstruct justice.8 8 This
combines both rationales-ensuring both "fair notice" and culpable
intent in one requirement. Finally, courts could find that a defendant
can be held accountable as long as he intends to obstruct justice,
which can be accomplished even when he acts with vague or incom-
plete knowledge about the proceeding.8 9 The next two sections ex-
plore the limitations of the first two paths.
87 See discussion infra Part II.B. 1.
88 See discussion infra Part II.C.1
89 The best example of this encompassing interpretation of the obstruction statutes
comes from Justice Scalia's dissent in Aguilar in which he argues that an actor can act with
an intent to obstruct justice even when he acts under a mistaken belief about the ob-
structed proceeding. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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B. The "Nexus" Requirement
1. The Aguilar Decision
In U.S. v. Aguilar,90 the Supreme Court established parameters
for the "catch-all" language in § 1503. In Aguilar, the Court upheld
the reversal of a conviction of a judge who lied to FBI agents during
an investigation into his conduct.9 1 The Court did not directly con-
front the question of the required knowledge of the obstructed pro-
ceedings because there was evidence that the defendant in Aguilar
knew of the grand jury proceedings against him when he lied to the
FBI agents. 92 The Court's reasoning, however, sheds light on the
question of how pre-emptive obstruction can and cannot be
criminalized.
The Aguilar Court held that the defendant's obstructive act of ly-
ing to investigators was not sufficiently connected to the grand jury
proceedings to uphold his conviction.9 3 Aguilar required that in or-
der to find a violation of § 1503, the courts must find a "nexus" be-
tween the obstructive act and the proceedings that the defendants
sought to impede. 94 The Court described the "nexus" element under
§ 1503 as requiring that "the act must have a relationship in time, cau-
sation, or logic with the judicial proceedings" and that "the endeavor
must have the 'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the
due administration ofjustice. ' '95
The Aguilar Court did not base the nexus requirement on consti-
tutional grounds, expressly disavowing such "broader grounds" for its
ruling as "unnecessary. '96 However, the Court alluded to the problem
of fair notice for defendants that lack knowledge of the obstructed
proceedings:
We have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a
federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of
Congress and out of concern that a fair warning should be given to
the world in language that the common world will understand, of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. 9 7
90 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
91 Id. at 606.
92 See id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 600-01 (ruling that the government's evidence "would not enable a rational
trier of fact to conclude that respondent knew that his false statement would be provided
to the grand jury").
94 Id. at 599-601.
95 Id. at 599 (citations omitted).
96 Id. at 600. The Court also declined to address respondent's contention that the
term "corruptly" in the statute was "vague and overbroad" as applied to this case. Id. at n.1.
97 Id. at 600 (internal quotation omitted). The Court subsequently cited Aguilarin a
case about fair notice for the proposition that "[t]he fair warning requirement... reflects
the deference due to the legislature, which possesses the power to define crimes and their
punishment." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.5 (1997).
2004] 1535
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Court approvingly quoted a 19th century Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the federal obstruction statutes for the proposition that "a
person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the
due administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he knew
or had notice that justice was being administered in such court."98
The Court required this nexus not only to ensure fair notice to the
defendant, but also because some knowledge of the proceeding's exis-
tence was a necessary component of the "intent to obstruct."99 The
Court declared that "if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions
are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite in-
tent to obstruct."'100 Thus, the Aguilar Court's "nexus" element not
only required a "natural and probable" link between the obstructive
act and the proceedings, but also that the defendant had knowledge
of the link during the time of the act.101
Three members of the Court joined in a dissent penned by Jus-
tice Scalia in which he described the majority's acceptance of the
"nexus" requirement as "importing extratextual requirements in or-
der to limit the reach of a federal criminal statute." 10 2 Justice Scalia
argued for imposing liability as early as obstructive intent could be
shown, which, he argued, a rational jury in Aguilar could have
found.'03 While his dissent noted that Judge Aguilar likely knew
about the ongoing proceeding against him,104 justice Scalia indicated
that he would punish a defendant for obstructing justice even if that
defendant acted under a mistaken belief about being the target of a
proceeding:
The critical point of knowledge at issue, in my view, is not whether
"respondent knew that his false statement would be provided to the
grand jury," (a heightened burden imposed by the Court's . . .
[nexus] requirement), but rather whether respondent knew-or in-
98 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599 (quoting Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206
(1893)).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 The Aguilar Court's application of the nexus requirement revealed that the deter-
minative component of the "nexus" test is the defendant's knowledge of how the obstruction
connects to the proceeding. The Court ruled that no rational trier of fact could have
found the requisite nexus since Judge Aguilar only knew that he was lying to an agent; to
assume the judge knew the statement would be repeated to the grand jury would be too
speculative. Id. at 601. The dissenters pointed out how this requirement centers on the
defendant's knowledge at the time of the act. According to the dissent, "The Court appar-
ently adds to its 'natural and probable effect' requirement the requirement that the defen-
dant know of that natural and probable effect." Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing the "nexus" require-
ment as part of the intent element).
102 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
103 Id. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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deed, even erroneously believed-that his false statement might be
provided to the grand jury (which is all the knowledge needed to
support the conclusion that the purpose of his lie was to mislead the
jury). 10 5
In responding to this idea, the Aguilar majority posed a hypothetical
case involving an act of obstruction that-in their view-fell short of
the bar they were setting for culpable conduct:
Under the dissent's theory, a man could be found guilty under
§ 1503 if he knew of a pending investigation and lied to his wife
about his whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI
agent might decide to interview her and that she might in turn be
influenced in her statement to the agent by her husband's false ac-
count of his whereabouts. The intent to obstruct justice is indeed
present, but the man's culpability is a good deal less clear from the
statute than we usually require in order to impose criminal
liability. 10 6
According to Justice Scalia's reading of § 1503, the only limitation on
convicting defendants for obstructing justice is their "intent to ob-
struct," and defendants' knowledge of the obstructed proceedings is
only relevant to establish that intent. 10 7 The dissent concluded by spe-
cifically rejecting the defendant's constitutional challenge that § 1503
was void for vagueness as applied to his acts.' 0 8
When lower courts look to Aguilar for guidance on how to inter-
pret the scope of § 1519, they will likely reach at least three conclu-
sions about the Supreme Court's interpretation. First, the Court
seems more likely to evaluate the applicability of federal obstruction
statutes on the basis of their construction rather than constitutional
notice requirements. 10 9 Second, three members of the Court have
found that an obstruction statute limited only by the requirement of a
defendant's intent to obstruct would survive constitutional chal-
lenge. 110 Third, six members of the Court have alluded to concerns
about whether a defendant has adequate notice when a broad statute
prohibits acts of obstruction that seem tenuously tethered to the ob-
structed proceeding."'
105 Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
106 Id. at 602.
107 Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think an act committed with intent to obstruct is
all that matters; and what one can fairly be thought to have intended depends in part upon
what one can fairly be thought to have known.").
108 See id. at 616-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also discussion infra Part V.B.
109 Id. at 605-06.
110 Id. at 609-17.
M1 Id. at 598-600.
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2. The Lack of "Nexus" Requirement in § 1512
Since the Aguilar ruling, the courts that have directly addressed
the nexus question refuse to require the government to show a nexus
in convictions secured under § 1512, effectively limiting the Aguilar
ruling's application to the broadly worded § 1503.112 Courts that re-
fuse to apply the nexus requirement have distinguished the witness-
tampering provision from the "catch-all" provision.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Gabriel,a l3 on facts
notably similar to Aguilar,1 4 found that the government did not need
to show a nexus between the obstruction and the proceeding in order
to support a conviction under § 1512.115 The Gabriel court reasoned
that the specificity of § 1512 allowed for the "fair notice to the world"
that § 1503 failed to capture.1 16 It also found that applying the Aguilar
"nexus" requirement to the panoply of obstruction statutes would
"work a major and unwarranted overhaul of the statutory scheme."1 1 7
The Gabriel court finally argued that importing into § 1512 the Aguilar
requirement that the obstructive act be "likely to affect" the proceed-
ing would import a "pending proceeding" requirement contrary to
the express provisions of the statute. 118
The Eleventh Circuit in U.S. v. Veal" 9 also refused to apply the
Aguilar nexus requirement to a conviction reached under
§ 1512(b) (3)-an obstruction statute which prohibits a defendant
from preventing communication of information to a law enforcement
officer regarding the commission of a federal offense. 120 The court
rejected the defendants' argument that the charge lacked the requi-
site "nexus" because the defendants never intended to obstruct a fed-
eral investigation, since their interaction was with state authorities.
12 1
The Veal court distinguished § 1503 from § 1512 by the nature of the
federal interest at stake; § 1503 seeks to protect the federal proceed-
ing itself, while § 1512 specifically protects the transmission of infor-
112 See Polkes, supra note 79, at 10.
113 125 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1997).
114 Id. at 103 ("[T]he facts in this case and in Aguilarare similar-each defendant was
convicted for telling a lie to a potential witness with the intent that the witness would
believe the lie and repeat it to a grand jury .
115 Id. at 104.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 105.
118 Id. at 104; see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1) (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(f)(1)
(West Supp. 2003).
119 153 F.3d 1233 (l1th Cir. 1998).
120 Id. at 1250; see 18 U.S.C. 1512(b) (3) (2000).
121 Id. at 1247-52 (summarizing this argument by the defendant).
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mation to federal authorities.' 22 Because the federal interest in
§ 1512 stems from the character of the obstructive act itself (lying to a
federal investigator), the Veal court found that the government needs
only to show a nexus between the defendant's obstructive act and the
interest at stake (the possibility that the defendant's misleading infor-
mation is communicated to a federal agent). 123
3. The "Nexus" Requirement Applied to § 1519
What does this mean for the judicial reception of § 1519? If
courts generally follow the Gabriel and Veal decisions, they could draw
on the same logic and not require the government to prove a nexus
between document destruction and the obstructed proceeding under
§ 1519. The Sarbanes-Oxley anti-shredding provision, § 1519, differs
from the § 1503 obstruction provision in many of the same ways that
the witness-tampering provision does. Like § 1512(b), § 1519 is statu-
torily designed to avoid a pending proceeding requirement. 124 Like
§ 1512(b), § 1519 criminalizes a specific subset of the activity covered
by the broad, "catch-all" language of § 1503.125 Also, as the Veal court
intimated, the various requirements of the different obstruction stat-
utes indicate that Congress did not intend any single requirement to
apply to all federal obstruction statutes.1 26
However, if courts understand Aguilar as requiring a certain mini-
mal connection for all cases of obstruction of justice, its application
would change. For example, under § 1519, an obstructive act would
need to have the "natural and probable" effect of obstructing justice,
122 Id. at 1250-51. By examining the federal interest at stake, the Veal court regarded
the Aguilar nexus requirement as a jurisdictional component of the obstruction statutes
rather than a requirement derived from concerns about notice or intent.
123 Id. at 1251. In contrast to the Veal and Gabriel courts, two Courts of Appeals, while
not explicitly exploring the issue, have used the language of Aguilar to evaluate convictions
under § 1512, effectively applying the nexus requirement to this statutory provision. In
reviewing a § 1512(b) conviction, the Third Circuit alluded to Aguilar without explicitly
citing the case by noting that "[t]o be criminally liable [for obstruction under § 1512], the
defendant must know that his conduct has the natural and probable effect of interfering
with the witness's communication." United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir.
1999), amended by 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit used similar Aguilar-
esque language when it required that "the government must demonstrate a logical connec-
tion between the acts of concealment and the official proceeding" for an obstruction
charge under § 1512. United States v. MacFarlane, No. 96-30296, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
2999, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1998). This broader interpretation of Aguilar holds that there
is a minimum level of connection required between the obstructive act and the obstructed
proceeding in allfederal obstruction statutes. However, it may be presumptuous to assume
that these courts are adopting such holdings without more explicit discussion of the issue.
124 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
125 Just as § 1512 targets witness tampering, § 1519 applies only to destruction and
alteration of documents. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West Supp. 2003).
126 See Veal 153 F.3d at 1249-50 (describing the different bases for the federal jurisdic-
tion of each of the obstruction statutes).
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and the government would also have to establish the defendant's
knowledge of that connection.12 7 The anticipatory act of obstruction
this Note describes is undertaken when the "natural and probable ef-
fect" of interfering with justice is low. If it is too speculative to infer a
defendant's knowledge that lying to an FBI agent would obstruct a
judicial proceeding of which he was aware, then it would clearly be
too speculative to convict a defendant who shreds documents in ad-
vance of a proceeding he suspects is in the offing.
Since Aguilar, lower courts have rarely confronted both the issue
of document destruction and the nexus requirement in the context of
anticipatory obstruction under § 1503.128 In U.S. v. Lundwall, the
Southern District of New York allowed a prosecution where the con-
nection between the documents destroyed and the proceedings was
somewhat tenuous. 29 The defendants were charged with obstruction
for concealing and destroying not just requested documents, but also
documents "likely to be requested by" the opposition. 130 The court
upheld the obstruction charge, not only for the documents the de-
fendants knew were being sought, but also for those documents they
should have anticipated would be requested.' 3 ' The court analyzed
the connection between the obstructive act and the proceeding as a
factual matter, and did not require that the actor have knowledge of
the connection.1 32
However, there is more uncertainty in the Second Circuit than
the Lundwall decision indicates. Several cases from the circuit show
that the Aguilar "nexus" requirement has hampered the use of § 1503
against acts of anticipatory obstruction. In a pre-Aguilar case, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals showed some willingness to allow the
omnibus provision to be used against anticipatory obstruction by hold-
ing that "destroying documents in anticipation of a subpoena can con-
127 For the argument that the Aguilar "nexus" requirement should apply to § 1512 and
§ 1519, as well as § 1503, see Polkes, supra note 79, at 7. Polkes, however, acknowledges
that § 1519 makes the argument for a nexus requirement more difficult because its lan-
guage was carefully crafted in order to avoid such restraint. Id.
128 See Strassberg & Braceras, supra note 30, at 1 (citing statistics showing that § 1512
became the predominant obstruction statute after 1995, the year in which the Supreme
Court imposed the 'nexus' requirement on obstruction of justice under § 1503); see also
Polkes, supra note 79, at 10 (" [T] here are very few reported cases that apply Aguila?'s nexus
requirement to a charge of obstruction ofjustice for document destruction under [§ 1505
and § 1503] ....").
129 See United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
130 Id. ("[T]he law is clear that neither a subpoena nor a court order directing the
production of documents must be issued or served as a prerequisite to a § 1503 prosecu-
tion, and that the concealment and destruction of documents likely to be sought by sub-
poena is actionable under the statute.").
131 Id.
132 Id. ("[T]he requisite nexus exists-there is no uncertainty that the alleged destruc-
tion of documents impaired a pending judicial proceeding.").
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stitute obstruction" under § 1503.133 However, in a post-A guilar case,
the Second Circuit refused to uphold a conviction for conspiracy to
obstruct justice that was formed in anticipation of a judicial proceed-
ing. In U.S. v. Schwarz,' 34 the government argued that three police
officers conspired to obstruct justice by lying to investigators, because
"experienced police officers-could have anticipated that a case such
as this would result in a federal grand jury proceeding."1 35 In stating
the law regarding conspiracy to obstruct justice, the Schwarz court re-
quired that the government show "knowledge, or at least anticipation,
of a pending judicial proceeding" as one of the elements of the of-
fense.136 However, the court expressly avoided the issue of whether
the government's theory of anticipation established the defendants'
knowledge of the proceeding sufficiently to sustain the charge. 137
The court found that an inquiry into the defendants' knowledge was
unnecessary because the government failed to prove the defendants'
specific intent to obstruct the federal grand jury.138 The Schwarz court
133 United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 450 (2d Cir. 1991).
134 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002).
135 Id. at 107. It is important to note that the charge in Schwarz was conspiracy to
obstruct justice. Id. at 105-06. While courts use various standards to assess the required
state of mind for this offense, courts generally seem more willing to punish those acting in
"anticipation" of the proceeding when the charge is conspiracy to obstruct justice. Id.; see
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 243 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 197 F.3d 662 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that conspiracy to obstruct justice charges requires "some proof that
the conspirators knew of or anticipated a grand jury investigation"); United States v.
Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 734-35 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that charges for conspiracy to
obstruct a proceeding do not require a pending proceeding at the formation of the con-
spiracy, but do require the defendants to have knowledge of the proceeding at the outset
that is "more than merely 'speculative'" (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,
601 (1995))). But see United States v. Cihak, 137 F.3d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1998) (retaining a
form of a pending proceeding requirement for conspiracy to obstruct justice by requiring
that a proceeding be pending "at the time the defendants acted"). The precise culpable
mindset required at the formation of a conspiracy to obstruct justice has only received
recent attention in the courts. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 195-96 (discussing a
1942 case preceding U.S. v. Davis in the Third Circuit which "affirmed convictions for a
conspiracy to obstruct ... even though the conspirators were not found guilty of the sub-
stantive crime of obstruction," and noting that these situations are "exceedingly rare").
Schwarz adds to these cases by finding that a "judicial proceeding need not be pending at
the time the conspiracy began so long as the appellants had reason to believe one would
begin and one in fact did." Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 107. However, Schwarz is cited here not to
explore the confluence of conspiracy and obstruction law, but rather to show the effect of
the Aguilar case on a court's willingness to allow prosecution of obstruction taken in antici-
pation of a proceeding. Schwarz shows the Second Circuit-a court once willing to accept
charges of obstructing an anticipated proceeding as sufficient for an underlying substantive
obstruction charge of § 1503-citing Aguilar to foreclose criminalization of anticipatory ob-
struction even when the charge is conspiracy to obstruct justice. Compare Schwarz, 283 F.3d at
107 (rejecting anticipatory conspiracy to obstruct charge) with Ruggiero, 934 F.2d at 450
(upholding anticipatory obstruction charge).
136 Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 105-06.
137 Id. at 107.
138 Id. The court did find that the one officer who received a subpoena had knowledge
of the proceeding, but went on to state that "we need not finally decide whether [the two
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found that "[a]t best, the government proved that [the subpoenaed
defendant] . . . , knowing of the existence of a federal grand jury in-
vestigation, lied to federal investigators regarding issues pertinent to
the grand jury's investigation."'139 Given this "best case" scenario of
the government's proof, the court found a missing connection and
reversed the conviction, citing Aguilar for the proposition that if the
defendant "lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the
judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. 140
Thus, the Schwarz case exemplifies how the "nexus" requirement aug-
ments the required mental state that the government must establish in
order to convict a defendant for obstructing justice. With the "nexus"
requirement, the government must show not only that a defendant
had knowledge about the proceeding when he acted, but also that the
defendant knew that his actions would have the natural and probable
effect of interfering with that proceeding. 14
C. Knowledge of a Particular Proceeding
Unlike its more broadly worded cousin, § 1503, the courts have
given an expansive reach to § 1512(b) in punishing obstructive acts
that occur in the early stages of investigations and enforcement. 142
Congress mandates that no "pending proceeding" requirement re-
strain the use of the statute, 143 and courts refuse to apply the "nexus"
requirement to witness-tampering charges. 144 For these reasons,
§ 1512 is a powerful tool for prosecutors seeking to impose criminal
liability early in the criminal storyline. However, some courts still de-
scribe § 1512(b) as reaching only those defendants who have knowl-
edge of particular investigations and proceedings initiated against
non-subpoenaed defendants'] ... knowledge was established because... we conclude that
there was insufficient evidence to support ajury finding that the appellants intended to...
violate § 1503." Id.
139 Id. at 109.
140 Id.
141 See also United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 448-51 (7th Cir. 2003) (allowing
for the jury to infer that the defendants, knowing that a grand jury was investigating their
taxes, thought their actions would have the required "probable effect" of obstructing jus-
tice); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc, 260 F. Supp. 2d 470, 475 (D. Conn.
2003) (upholding sufficiency of an indictment for pre-subpoena document destruction,
but noting that the government is required to prove at trial that the defendant thought his
obstructive actions were "likely to affect the grand jury").
142 See Coffee, supra note 69, at A19 (noting that § 1512 "extended the net of criminal
liability" to pre-proceeding obstructive acts prohibited by § 1503); Chase, supra note 45, at
740-41; see also United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 650-53 (1st Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing a § 1512(b) conviction while reversing a § 1503 conviction on the same conduct where
there was an ambiguous connection between the proceeding and the act).
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1) (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(f)(1) (West Supp.
2003).
144 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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them. 145 In addition, the instruction to juries that they must find an
intent to obstruct a proceeding at the time of the act-even though
there does not need to be an actual proceeding at that point-seems
contradictory, leading to jury confusion in some high-profile cases. 146
For these reasons, the document-destruction provision of § 1512 is
more limited than the new anti-shredding provision.
1. Specific Knowledge or General Knowledge of the Proceeding?
Courts are divided on the question of how specific the defen-
dant's knowledge about the obstructed proceeding must be in order
to establish the defendant's intent to obstruct. In U.S. v. Shively,147 the
Fifth Circuit announced the most restrictive standard for the knowl-
edge a defendant must have before obstruction may be charged.
While acknowledging that the witness-tampering statute specifically
does not require that a proceeding be pending at the time of the act,
the court noted that the statute still requires an "intent to obstruct"-
an element the court felt must be given meaning:
A defendant can act without knowledge of an official proceeding or
its federal nature and, as a result, influence the witness's testimony
at that proceeding. The coincidence of this act and result will not
suffice, however, for criminal liability to attach under... [§ 1512].
Without at least a circumstantial showing of intent to affect testi-
mony at some particular federal proceeding that is ongoing or is
scheduled to be commenced in the future, this statute does not pro-
scribe his conduct. 148
The Shively court reversed the defendants' convictions under § 1512
because of the insufficient evidence that they knew of the federal in-
vestigators' involvement at the time of the obstructive act. 149
Similarly, the First Circuit in U.S. v. Frankhauser150 required some
knowledge of the obstructed proceeding under § 1512(b), while not-
ing that the burden was lighter than that imposed by § 1503.151 The
Frankhauser court reversed a defendant's conviction under § 1503 be-
cause he did not have adequate notice that he was obstructing a grand
jury proceeding. 152 The court, however, affirmed the defendant's
conviction under § 1512 even though the same factual ambiguity exis-
145 See United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Coffee,
supra note 69, at A19 ("The only important issue on which courts have divided [in applica-
tion of § 1512(b)] involves whether the defendant must know that an official proceeding is
imminent or has been scheduled.").
146 See infra Part III.
147 927 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1991).
148 Id. at 812-13.
149 See id
150 80 F.3d 641 (1st Cir. 1996).
151 Id. at 651-52.
152 Id. at 651.
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ted regarding the defendant's knowledge about the obstructed pro-
ceeding. 153 The court differentiated between "actual knowledge" of a
proceeding and knowledge in relation to the intent to obstruct:
Because an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be
instituted at the time of the corrupt persuasion .... [§ 1512] obvi-
ously cannot require actual knowledge of a pending proceeding.
On the other hand, the defendant must act knowingly and with the
intent to impair an object's availability for use in a particular official
proceeding. 154
The Frankhauser court rejected the approach taken in Shively "insofar
as . . .a defendant in every case must actually know that an official
proceeding has been commenced or scheduled. ' 15 5 The Frankhauser
court also rejected another court's holding "insofar as . . . [it allows
for] conviction in any case where there is some circumstantial evi-
dence that the defendant may have foreseen an official proceeding at
some time in the future."'156 In what appeared to be an attempt to
reach a compromise between these two cases, the Frankhauser court
evaluated whether the defendant intended to interfere with "an iden-
tifiable official proceeding."'157
Other courts describe the state of mind required under § 1512 as
somewhat less specific than the intent to obstruct a "particular" in-
quiry.158 In U.S. v. Kelley,159 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals de-
scribed the defendant's awareness of the obstructed proceeding in
more subjective terms than the Fifth and First Circuits had:
[Section] 1512 does not require explicit proof of knowledge on the
part of. . . [the defendant] that such proceedings were pending or
were about to be instituted. The statute only requires that the jury
be able reasonably to infer from the circumstances that . . .[the
defendant], fearing that a grandjury proceeding had been or might
be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons with the intent to influ-
ence their possible testimony in such a proceeding. 160
153 Id. at 652.
154 Id. at 651.
155 Id. at 652.
156 Id. The second case referred to by the Frankhauser court was U.S. v. Conneaut Indus-
tries, Inc. See discussion infra note 161 and accompanying text.
157 Frankhauser, 80 F.3d at 652.
158 See Coffee, supra note 69, at A19 (noting that courts have relied on the "no pending
proceeding" requirement to reject the requirement of knowledge of a proceeding).
159 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
160 Id. at 1128 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 248 (3d
Cir. 1999), amended by 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that since § 1512 has no pend-
ing proceeding requirement, "[a] reasonable belief that the named witness will communi-
cate information to a law enforcement officer is enough to create liability under the
statute").
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Similarly, a court in the District of Rhode Island inferred from the
circumstances that a defendant who ordered document destruction
intended to obstruct a federal proceeding where. "she realized that a
federal proceeding could be commenced in the future."'16 1 According
to such cases, obstructive acts caused only by the defendant's "fear" or
"realization" of a future proceeding could be prosecuted. These cases
are the closest that federal courts have come to recognizing the of-
fense of anticipatory obstruction.
A high-profile case recently forced the Fifth Circuit to revisit this
issue, though the court did little to answer the questions it raised. In
Arthur Andersen's criminal trial for obstruction, the company cited
Shively and urged the court to instruct the jury to find a "specific pur-
pose of making that [document] ... unavailable for use in a particular
official proceeding that is ongoing or has been scheduled to be com-
menced in the future."162 Instead, the judge simply charged the jury
to find an intent to impede "an official proceeding"-an instruction
Arthur Andersen contested on appeal. 163
In upholding the guilty verdict, the Fifth Circuit first noted that
"§ 1512(b) (2) . . .does not offer guidance as to the concreteness of
the defendant's expectation of a proceeding."1 6 4 The Andersen court
rejected the language in Shively requiring the obstructed proceeding
to be "ongoing or scheduled." 165 The court found the language to be
"dicta" that could not be reconciled with the "plain language of the
statute."
166
The court gave more attention to the argument that the govern-
ment should be required to show that Arthur Andersen had a "partic-
ular" proceeding in mind to be convicted for obstruction, finding this
contention to be "not without force. 1 6 7 The court pointed out that
"without insisting that a defendant's intent to impede a proceding
have some limiting sights, companies could be convicted for maintain-
161 United States v. Conneaut Industries, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 116, 125 (D.R.I. 1994).
162 Andersen's Proposed Jury Instructions at 4, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP,
2002 WNL 32153900 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2002) (No. 02-0121).
163 Court's Instructions to the Jury, United Stated v. Arthur Andersen, LLP (No 02-
0121), reprinted inJULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERI-
AL.s 446 (2d ed. 2003); Reply Brief of Appellant Arthur Andersen, LLP at 16-17, United
States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2003 WL 22160032 (5th Cir. June 30, 2003) (No. 02-
21200); Brief for United States at 50-54, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2003 WL
22340391 (5th Cir. June 2, 2003) (No. 02-21200).
164 United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. 02-21200, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11814, at
*42-43 (5th Cir. June 16, 2004).
165 Id. at *44.
166 Id. The court supported its conclusion that this language was dicta by noting that
Shively had found the government had failed to show intent. Id. The language from the
case, however, clearly linked the idea of the defendant's knowledge to the idea of his in-
tent. See supra note 148.
167 Arthur Anderson v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11814, at *45.
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ing records retention programs which were adopted with no proceed-
ing in mind."168 The court hinted that those limits may lie in "a
sound application of the elements of corrupt purpose and intent." 69
The court, however, concluded that "[w]herever the permissible
reach of [§ 1512(b) (2)] may be finally drawn, it is beyond the reach
of this case" since Arthur Andersen had been tried under a theory of
obstructing "a proceeding of the SEC" and not "some other shadowy
opponent.
v1 7 0
In Andersen, the Fifth Circuit left open the question of whether
§ 1512(b) (2) could be used in a case of anticipatory obstruction. On
the one hand, the Andersen court rejected some of the language in
Shively that would restrict the use of § 1512(b) (2) to proceedings that
were "ongoing or scheduled." On the other hand, by finding that the
audit company's knowledge of a specific SEC proceeding was concrete
enough to uphold the convention, the Andersen court implicitly re-
tained Shively's "particular proceeding" requirement. It also expressly
refused to demarcate how courts can discern the future defendants
who are acting with concrete enough knowledge when they destroy
documents from those acting with only a "shadowy opponent" in
mind. At a minimum, Andersen teaches that the specificity or "con-
creteness" required of a defendant's knowledge under § 1512(b) (2)
remains unsettled.
2. Witness-Tampering Statute's Limitations Applied to § 1519
Courts looking to cases involving acts of anticipatory obstruction
under the witness-tampering statute will find two strains of legal rea-
soning that could limit the applicability of § 1519. First, they will see
the requirement that the defendants must have specific knowledge
about the document-seeking proceeding before the documents' de-
struction becomes criminal. This idea runs counter to the idea that
anticipatory obstruction is criminally culpable. Not only would courts
allow the "half-knowledge" defense advanced by Frank Quattrone in
his first obstruction trial to reach a jury,171 but without some evidence
of the specificity of the defendant's knowledge, a conviction could not
stand on appeal. Such a requirement protects the actor who disposes
of evidence before it is established that he knows of the proceeding
seeking it, and contradicts the expressed congressional intent in draft-
ing the measure. 172
168 Id. at *46.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Quattrone claimed to know about the government inquiry, but did not believe that
the scope of the inquiry covered documents in his possession. See Part III.C.
172 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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Second, these cases also show how the pending proceeding re-
quirement is only partially removed from § 1512(b). 7 3  The
Frankhauser and Shively cases show the courts' conundrum in interpret-
ing legislative efforts to rid obstruction statues of the "pending pro-
ceeding" requirement. While the courts admit, on the one hand, that
no pending proceeding is required in order to convict under § 1512,
the courts still question whether the defendant intended to interfere
with "some particular federal proceeding that is ongoing or is sched-
uled to be commenced in the future"'174 or an "identifiable official
proceeding.''7 5 In other words, the effect of § 1512(e) is that even
though the government no longer needs to show a pending proceed-
ing at the time of the act, it must still prove the actor's intent to ob-
struct a specific and identifiable proceeding-which is almost
impossible if no proceeding has yet begun. 176 This retention of a
"pending proceeding" requirement may be precisely what Senator
Patrick Leahy referred to when he stated that § 1519 is "specifically
meant not to include any technical requirement ... to tie the obstruc-
tive conduct to a pending or imminent proceeding or matter by intent
or otherwise.''1 77
While the Frankhauser and Shively decisions dealt with the stan-
dards for reviewing convictions on appeal, the pending proceeding
and intent paradox will more likely directly impact the courtroom
through jury instructions. The courts' interpretation of the witness-
tampering statute compels judges to give jury instructions that may
appear contradictory to the average juror: 'You must find that the de-
fendant acted with the intent to obstruct an official proceeding, and
there need be no proceeding pending when the defendant acted." 78
173 See Coffee, supra note 69, at A19 (noting that the relaxed language of § 1512 "still
retains a form of the 'official proceeding' requirement" because it will only allow punish-
ment for obstructing a proceeding commenced later "if there was an intent to render
documents unavailable for use in any such proceeding").
174 United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1991).
175 United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 652 (1st Cir. 1996).
176 There is, perhaps, room within the logic of this paradox for the prosecution of an
anticipatory obstruction. The employee in this Note's introduction destroyed documents
intending to interfere with a government investigation (an identifiable proceeding) even
though her company had not yet involved the government authorities (no existing pro-
ceeding yet). An appeals court deciding our hypothetical would then cleanly resolve the
question of whether this kind of conviction could legally stand. This Note's examination
of § 1512(b) does not hope to establish that prosecuting anticipatory obstruction ofjustice
under the statute is a logical impossibility. Rather, this is only meant to point out that the
witness-tampering statute retains some legal obstacles (the specific knowledge require-
ment) and some practical obstacles (juror confusion, discussed in Part III) to the prosecu-
tion of anticipatory obstruction.
177 148 CONG. Rac. S7,419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (empha-
sis added); see also infra note 266 and accompanying text; discussion Part 1V.B.
178 See, e.g., Court's Instructions to the Jury, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP
(S.D. Tex.) (No. 02-121), reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 447-48.
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These paradoxical instructions may contribute to some jury confu-
sion, which is explored further in Part III.
III
JURY CONFUSION
A. U.S. v. Arthur Andersen: The Government's Theory
The criticism that § 1519 is merely a redundant statute is bol-
stered by the result in the case for which it was designed: the convic-
tion of Arthur Andersen for obstructing justice. In U.S. v. Arthur
Andersen, prosecutors presented a story of a massive, company-wide
shredding operation on the eve of an SEC subpoena. 179 The convic-
tion of the company was obtained under § 1512 (b).180 If federal pros-
ecutors could effectively convict Arthur Andersen under the witness-
tampering statute, why is a new anti-shredding statute necessary? 18 1 If
Arthur Andersen was punished for wrongdoing, is the new anti-shred-
ding provision part of the sound and fury of Sarbanes-Oxley, signify-
ing nothing? 82 While at first glance the Arthur Andersen conviction
would seem to support this argument, a closer examination of the
guilty verdict in the case shows a vast disparity between the prosecu-
tion's legal rationale and the jury's rationale for convicting the com-
pany. 18 3 This disparity indicates that the government's success in
obtaining a guilty verdict in the Andersen case may mask the weak-
nesses of the obstruction statute used to reach that result.
The indictment of Arthur Andersen laid out the government's
case against the audit company for violating § 1512(b) (2).184 The in-
dictment consisted of four sections in which the government asserted
the facts of the case. 18 5 The first described the players in the offense:
Arthur Andersen and Enron. 86 The second listed a number of events
leading up to the SEC investigation of Enron and Andersen which
point to Andersen's motive for the document destruction. 187 The
179 Indictment 1 8-12, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2002 IAIL 32153945
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2002) (No. 02-121).
180 Id. 13.
181 See Lowell & Arnold, supra note 16, at 225-26 (describing the Justice Department's
successful Arthur Andersen conviction under existing statute § 1512(b) as ironic and ques-
tioning whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's anti-shredding provision was really necessary).
182 See Falvey & Wolfman, supra note 14, at 2.
183 See Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at
A23; discussion infra Part III.A-B.
184 Indictment 13, Arthur Andersen, 2002 IArL 32153945 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2002)
(No. 02-121).
185 Id. 1 1-13.
186 Id. 97 1-4.
187 Id. 77 5-8.
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third section described the actus reus of the offense. 18 8 The fourth
described the law under which the charge was brought.189
In the third section of the indictment, the government charged
the company with engaging in a company-wide shredding effort in
anticipation of an SEC subpoena:
ANDERSEN personnel were called to urgent and mandatory meet-
ings. Instead of being advised to preserve documentation so as to
assist Enron and the SEC, ANDERSEN employees on the Enron en-
gagement team were instructed . . . to destroy immediately docu-
mentation relating to Enron, and told to work overtime if necessary
to accomplish the destruction. During the next few weeks, an un-
paralleled initiative was undertaken to shred physical documenta-
tion and delete computer files. Tons of paper relating to the Enron
audit were promptly shredded as part of the orchestrated document
destruction. The shredder at the ANDERSEN office at the Enron
building was used virtually constantly and, to handle the overload,
dozens of large trunks filled with Enron documents were sent to
ANDERSEN's main Houston office to be shredded. A systematic
effort was also undertaken and carried out to purge the computer
hard-drives and E-mail System of Enron-related files.' 9 0
The indictment also listed other offices participating in the shredding
and alluded to the e-mail telling employees that "there could be no
more shredding," which was sent after the SEC served the firm with a
subpoena.' 9 1 In its description of the factual context leading up to
the document destruction, the government also mentioned a press
release issued by Enron in October 2001 that spurred the SEC's inves-
tigation of the company. 192 The indictment, however, did not de-
scribe the details of how Enron drafted the press releaseI 3-actions
the jurors thought to be crucial. 194
The government's trial strategy also conveyed its theory that the
firm had committed obstruction through the company-wide shred-
ding.' 9 5 The government negotiated a plea bargain with former Ar-
thur Andersen partner David Duncan in exchange for his testimony
regarding his intention in ordering employees to destroy docu-
188 Id. 1 9-12.
189 Id. 1 13.
190 Id. 1 10. Numerous spelling errors, likely caused by electronic reproduction of the
document, have been corrected. Compare Indictment 1 6, United States v. Arthur Ander-
sen, LLP, 2002 VWrL 32153945 (S.D. Mar. 14, Tex. 2002) (No. 02-121) with http://news.find
law.com/hdocs/docs/enron/nsandersen030802ind.html.
191 See id. 1 11-12; Chase, supra note 45, at 752.
192 Indictment at 6, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2002 WL 32153945 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (No. 02-121).
193 Id. 11 6, 8.
194 Infra Part III.B.
195 See Gillers, supra note 183, at A23.
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ments. t9 6 The government produced Arthur Andersen's billing
records which indicated "the firm billed Enron almost $540,000 for
work on the matter under a line item called 'S.E.C. Inquiry"' during
the eleven days after the firm learned of the SEC investigation to show
the firm's widespread awareness of the investigation.1 97 The govern-
ment also entered into evidence Duncan's e-mails instructing his em-
ployees to "stop the shredding," which he sent after the company was
formally notified of an investigation.' 98 In his closing argument, fed-
eral prosecutor Samuel Buell compared the ninety pounds of Enron
documents which Arthur Andersen shredded each day before learning
of the SEC investigation with the 3,500 pounds of documents that the
firm shredded daily after learning of the SEC investigation and con-
cluded that the firm was "getting ready to deal with the [SEC] and the
investors who would sue them." 19 9 Buell argued that the firm's strat-
egy was "the less the better," and remarked, "[w] ho knows what kind
of hideous documents might be buried in those worker bee files."200
At the close of the case, Arthur Andersen's lawyers, citing U.S. v.
Shively,2 01 urged the court to instruct the jury that it had to find "spe-
cific purpose [by Andersen] of making th[e] object unavailable for
use in a particular official proceeding that is ongoing or has been
scheduled to be commenced in the future. ' 20 2 DistrictJudge Melinda
Harmon refused this suggested instruction and opted instead for an
instruction eliminating the pending proceeding requirement, but re-
quiring an intent to obstruct an official proceeding:
In order to establish that Andersen committed the charged offense,
it is not necessary for the government to prove that an official pro-
ceeding was pending, or even about to be initiated, at the time the
obstructive conduct occurred. Nor is it necessary for the govern-
ment to prove that a subpoena had been served on Andersen or any
other party at the time of the offense. The government need only
196 See Tom Fowler, 'Soul Searching' Led to Plea, Duncan Says, HOUSTON CHRON., May 16,
2002, at 1A (noting that Davis testified that he agreed to the plea only after "soul searching
about [his] . . .intent and what was in [his] . .. head at the time" and that he admitted to
being motivated by a fear of the SEC investigation).
197 Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Auditors Knew about Federal Inquiry, Records at Trial Show,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2002, at CIO (quoting a former prosecutor who stated that the docu-
ments "impute knowledge of the S.E.C. inquiry to the entire firm").
198 Arthur Andersen apparently was operating under the misunderstanding that docu-
ment destruction was legal up until the firm was formally notified of the proceeding. See
Coffee, supra note 69, at A19; Stephan Landsman, Death of an Accountant: The Jury Convicts
Arthur Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KE,'Nr L. REV. 1203, 1238 (2003).
199 Arthur Andersen Investigation: Criminal Case Goes to Jury, 62 FACTS ON FILE 437, 440
(2002).
200 Jeff Leeds, Andersen Jury Hears Forceful Arguments, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at Cl.
201 927 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1991); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
202 Andersen's ProposedJury Instructions at 4, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP,
2002 WL 32153900 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2002) (No. 02-0121).
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prove that Andersen acted corruptly and with the intent to withhold
an object or impair an object's availability for use in an official pro-
ceeding, that is, a regulatory proceeding or investigation whether or
not that proceeding had begun or whether or not a subpoena had
been served.
20 3
Although the instruction effectively dispels jurors of the notion that
the SEC subpoena issuance was the moment at which the shredding
became impermissible, Judge Harmon faced the same conundrum
that surfaced in both Frankhauser and Shively.204 On the one hand, the
instructions assure jurors that it is unnecessary to find a pending pro-
ceeding when the obstruction occurred. On the other hand, the
charges instruct the jurors that they must find an intent to impede an
official proceeding.
B. U.S. v. Arthur Andersen: The Jury's Theory
Eight days into deliberations, the jury sought the court's gui-
dance by posing a hypothetical to Judge Harmon: "If each of us be-
lieves that one Andersen agent acted knowingly and with corrupt
intent, is it for all of us to believe that it was the same agent.... Can
one believe it was Agent A, another believe it was Agent B, and an-
other believe it was Agent C?"20 5 The question struck on a fine point
of corporate criminal law, whether a firm could be convicted for ob-
struction even if jurors disagreed about which specific actor at the
firm had criminal intent. 20 6 Acknowledging the lack of case law on
point, Judge Harmon ruled that a conviction could be reached de-
spite jurors' disagreement on "who at Andersen had criminal in-
tent."20 7 Although this ruling may spur debate about criminal
corporate culpability issues, the question and its answer are significant
in evaluating § 1512(b) because they demonstrate the jury's difficulty
in finding the precise state of mind required for a conviction. 20 8
On June 15, 2002, the jury returned a verdict finding Arthur An-
dersen guilty of obstruction of justice.20 9 However, in post-verdict in-
203 Court's Instructions to the Jury, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP (S.D. Tex.)
(No. 02-121), reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 447-48.
204 See discussion supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
205 Kurt Eichenwald, AndersenJury Startles Court with Question: Both Sides Researching Law
on Issues of Intent, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at C1 (quoting the note from the jury to
District Judge Melinda Harmon).
206 See Lisa Girion, Jury Query Reveals a Gray Area of the Law, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at
Cl.
207 Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Judge's Answer Backs Andersen Prosecution, HOUSTON
CHRON., June 15, 2002, at IA (quotingJudge Harmon describing the issue as a question of
first impression).
208 See Landsman, supra note 198, at 1218 (describing the Andersen jury's difficulty in
reaching a verdict).
209 See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron: Firm Informs
U.S. It Will Give Up Auditing Public Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al.
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terviews, jurors declared that they had rejected the government's
theory of the obstruction. Oscar Criner, the jury foreman, told re-
porters that "[a]ll this business about telling people to shred docu-
ments was largely superficial and largely circumstantial" 210 and that
the jury's quest to find a corrupt persuader within Andersen had "al-
most... nothing to do with shredding documents."21 1 Instead of fo-
cusing on the massive shredding operation, the jury focused on an e-
mail in which Nancy Temple, an in-house Andersen lawyer in Chi-
cago, advised David Duncan, lead Enron auditor, about altering the
press release. 21 2 Criner described Temple's e-mail as a "smoking
gun," and told reporters he would have voted against a conviction
based on the shredding alone. 21 3 According to juror Wanda McKay,
"Nancy Temple was found guilty of altering one document .... One
person did one thing and tore the whole company down." 2 14
The jurors' basis for the guilty verdict was surprising for several
reasons. First, the jury relied on a wholly different theory of obstruc-
tion than the one the government presented. 21 5 Nowhere in the in-
dictment does the government allege that Arthur Andersen was guilty
of obstruction for altering documents; rather, the indictment focuses
on document destruction. 21 6 Second, § 1515(c), a "safe harbor" pro-
vision, arguably covers Ms. Temple's advice as in-house counsel and
thus protects it from obstruction charges as a matter of law.2 17 Tem-
ple's e-mail offered such common legal advice that the chairman of
the American Corporate Counsel Association wrote in a letter to his
members: "Who amongst us has not thought: 'There but for the grace
of God go I.' "218 This "smoking gun" e-mail seemed so innocuous
that practitioners declared the Andersen case "a nightmare for inside
210 Mary Flood, Decision by Jurors Hinged on Memo, HOUSTON CHRON., June 16, 2002, at
IA.
211 Jury Finds Arthur Andersen Guilty of Obstructing Justice (NPR radio broadcast, June 15,
2002).
212 See Flood, supra note 210, at IA; Gillers, supra note 183, at A23.
213 See Flood, supra note 210, at 27A (quoting Oscar Criner).
214 Jonathan D. Glater & John Schwartz, Jurors Tell of Emotional Days in a Small Room,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at A14.
215 See Gillers, supra note 183, at A23 ("[T]he jury was unimpressed with the govern-
ment's theory and came up with its own."); Landsman, supra note 198, at 1218 (describing
that the basis on which the jurors agreed to convict as "not... the one primarily pressed by
the government"); Mary Mullally, The Killer E-mail, LEGAL WEEK, June 27, 2002, available at
http://www.legalweek.com/Printltem.asp?id=9561 ("IT] he jury chose to focus on a com-
munication which was largely ignored by the lawyers on both sides.").
216 See Indictment at 1-13, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2002 WL
32153945 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2002) (No. 02-121).
217 See Gillers, supra note 183, at A23 (arguing that Temple's e-mail falls into
§ 1515(c)'s exception for "lawful, bona fide, legal representation services").
218 Jon Robins, The Whole Truth?; Enronitis Has Caused a Fever of Anticipation-and-Dread-
Over New Regulations to Make Corporate Lawyers Report Client Misdeeds to the Powers That Be, THE
LAWYER, July 29, 2002, at US3.
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counsel," and predicted it would "mark the end, for both lawyer and
client, of the traditional safe-haven . . . [for] unfettered advice to a
corporate client."2 19 As Legal Ethics Professor Stephen Gillers de-
clared: "Nancy Temple's e-mail message was not a crime: she was giv-
ing bona fide legal advice to a client[,] . . . the kind of advice lawyers
routinely give .... [T]hejury's flawed theory gives the government a
victory that is hard to accept."2 20
Andersen's attorneys seized on the discrepancy between the ju-
rors' rationale for their verdict and the government's theory in their
motion for a new trial. 22 1 Arthur Andersen's attorneys argued that
Temple's e-mail fell under the safe harbor provision of § 1515(c) and
that the evidence at trial was in "fatal variance" with the indictment. 222
The government debated this point,2 23 and the court rejected the ar-
gument, basing its decision on a federal rule of evidence 224 that bars
the court from re-examining a verdict's validity based on post-verdict
press interviews about jury deliberations. 22 5
The jury's rationale for convicting Arthur Andersen is a puzzle.
Why did the jury find it easier to convict the firm on the basis of a
rather mundane e-mail from corporate counsel regarding a press re-
lease rather than a corporation-wide effort to destroy as many docu-
ments as possible before the receipt of a government subpoena? Any
analysis of the practical impact and import of federal obstruction stat-
utes demands an answer.
A close examination of the Temple e-mail reveals a key distinc-
tion between the government's theory and the jury's theory of the
case. For ajury concerned and confused about what state of mind was
required in order to convict a corporation, Ms. Temple's e-mail shows
a culpable mental state with two elements on the same page: an intent
to alter a document and an awareness of legal proceedings. In her e-
mail, Temple makes three suggestions related to the firm's prepara-
tion of an Enron-related press release. First, she suggested deleting
219 Loren Schechter et al., The Effect of the Arthur Andersen Verdict on Inside Counsel, 3 J.
INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE, Summer 2002, at 27, 29.
220 Gillers, supra note 183, at A23; see also Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Team Weighs Asking
Judge to Undo Guilty Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at CI ("What the jury fixated on with
Nancy Temple is conduct that is simply not criminal." (quoting Charles Rothfeld, a lawyer
for Arthur Andersen)).
221 Andersen's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, United States v. Ar-
thur Andersen, LLP (No. 02-121), reprinted in O'SULLVAN, supra note 163, at 449-50.
222 See id. at 453-54.
223 Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Andersen's Motion for a
Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP (No. 02-121),
reprinted in O'SULLVAN, supra note 163, at 459-61 (arguing that Temple's advice consti-
tuted fraud, so that it was not "lawful" advice under § 1515(c) and that § 1512(b) covers
alteration of documents as well as their destruction).
224 See O'SULLIVAN, Supra note 163, at 461.
225 FED. R. EviD. 606(b).
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her name from the memo, because she stated that having her name
on the memo "increase[d] the chances that I might be a witness,
which I [would] prefer to avoid."2 26 Second, she proposed removing
language in the memo that "might suggest [that Andersen had] ...
concluded the release is misleading. '" 22 7 Third, she offered to investi-
gate whether a characterization in the memo would violate certain
SEC auditing regulations. 228
In opposing Andersen's post-verdict motion to dismiss, federal
prosecutors defended the jury's rationale for its verdict, arguing that
Temple's second suggestion was a "dramatic demonstration" of how
the draft was being "sanitized" before the outside world viewed it.229
If this was the wrongdoing on which the jury convicted Arthur Ander-
sen, it is a less dramatic demonstration of culpability than the shred-
ding effort. The distinguishing feature of the memo was not Temple's
second suggestion, but her first, which shows her awareness of the fu-
ture legal proceedings and her expressed desire to avoid involvement
in them.230 Unlike the government's theory in which the "intent" ele-
ment was amorphous enough to prompt the jury's question about tri-
furcated corporate culpable intent, the intentional alteration of the
memo exists on the same page as Temple's discussion of legal pro-
ceedings. Only if the jury's reluctance to convict was based on its in-
ability to connect the intent to obstruct with a pending legal
proceeding would Temple's e-mail be crucial in bridging that gap.23 1
Deciphering a theory of Arthur Andersen's culpability that only a
few jurors held may not help fully understand the general applicability
of federal obstruction statutes. However, the disparity between the
jury's theory and the government's theory of the case is instructive for
future prosecutions of obstructive document destruction in white-col-
lar cases. First, it is important to understand that the underlying basis
226 Government Exhibit No. 1018B, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP (S.D. Tex.)
(No. 02-121), reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 463 (depicting the e-mail from
Nancy Temple to David Duncan)).
227 Id.
228 See id.
229 Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Andersen's Motion for a
Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP (No. 02-121),
reprinted in O'SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 458.
230 See Schechter et al., supra note 219, at 28-29 (arguing that Ms. Temple's awareness
of litigation may make the e-mail vulnerable to be construed as an attempt to alter docu-
ments with intent to obstruct an official proceeding).
231 The comments from the jury foreman, Oscar Criner, about the case also suggest
that the memo connecting Temple's intent to the proceeding was crucial. Mr. Criner de-
scribed the law as prohibiting "[alteration of] the document with the intent to impair the
fact-finding ability of an official proceeding" and described the e-mail as a "smoking gun."
Lianne Hart, Deliberations Came Down to a Single Memo, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A24.
According to Criner, "You read [the e-mail] .... you read the law in the charge, and it just
stands out." Flood, supra note 210, at 27A.
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for the government's case against Arthur Andersen failed. 232 The jury
convicted the firm based on a theory that was not presented to
them.2 33 Second, although the court instructed the jury that no pro-
ceeding needed to be pending at the time of the obstructive act, the
jury seemed to be confounded by questions regarding the requisite
state of mind to convict under § 1512(b). This confusion is evident in
both the jury's question to the judge about the intent of different cor-
porate actors234 and in the only piece of evidence on which all jurors
agreed-a memo that exhibits both an intent to alter documents and
an awareness of legal proceedings. 235 The final lesson in the Arthur
Andersen verdict is the weaknesses of using § 1512 to prosecute shred-
ders for document destruction. Even if courts give instructions which
relieve the government from having to prove that a proceeding was
pending when the obstruction occurred, juries may still find that the
plain language of § 1512 (requiring an intent to impact "an official
proceeding"236) imposes a burden on the government to prove that a
document shredder was aware of the proceedings. 237
C. U.S. v. Quattrone: The Hung Jury
The first, unsuccessful obstruction prosecution of Credit Suisse
First Boston banker Frank Quattrone is another example of the inabil-
ity or unwillingness of jurors to convict for document destruction if a
defendant's awareness of the obstructed proceeding is in question. 238
The basis for the case against Quattrone was described as "simple,
slender, and well known"-an e-mail that Mr. Quattrone forwarded to
his subordinates reminding them of a corporate retention policy after
learning about a government investigation into his company.239 The
232 See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting at least one juror's refusal to
convict based on the shredding theory).
233 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
235 See discussion supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
236 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000).
237 This can be seen in judge Harmon's jury instruction, which described the proceed-
ing as part of the intent to obstruct. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. It is also
evident in jurors' descriptions of their understanding of the law presented in the charge.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
238 This section focuses on Frank Quattrone's first trial, which led to a hung jury. In
his second trial, Quatrrone was found guilty of obstructing justice. Terence Neilan, Ex-
Banker Is Convicted of Obstructing Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at Al. However,
this guilty verdict does not change this section's conclusion that the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
statutes, under which he was charged, resulted injury confusion in his first trial. Whatever
lessons can be drawn from the different outcomes, the effectiveness of pre-§ 1519 obstruc-
tion statutes to penalize acts of anticipatory document destruction remains very much in
doubt.
239 E. Scott Reckard, US. May Push to Retry Quattrone; Prosecutors Could View Conviction as
Necessary to Bolster Other Cases Involving Allegations of White-Collar Crime, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2003, at CI; United States v. Quattrone, Indictment at 36-44, available at http://news.
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government charged Quattrone with obstruction of justice under all
of the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley statutes-sections 1503, 1505, and
1512(b).240
The case came down to a simple debate over the extent to which
Quattrone knew about the investigation at the time of the obstructive
act. Quattrone testified that he did not realize that the investigation
had broadened so far to encompass the documents he directed his
subordinates to destroy.241 Quattrone's attorney concentrated on the
"intent" element during his questioning of Quattrone: "Were you in-
tending to obstruct justice in a Securities and Exchange Commission
investigation? ... Were you intending to obstruct a grandjury investi-
gation? . . . Were you intending to tamper with witnesses?" This
prompted a series of "No, I was not" answers from Quattrone. 242 The
government, on the other hand, presented testimony from the lawyer
who informed Quattrone of the investigation; he claimed that the
banker knew of the scope of the investigation and that the documents
ordered to be destroyed were within that scope.2 43 They also
presented numerous e-mails showing Quattrone and colleagues dis-
cussing the investigation and document retention reminders.244
The question of Quattrone's state of mind was ultimately the is-
sue that deadlocked the jury. The most telling sign that this issue was
the stumbling block came before the judge declared a mistrial. Dur-
ing deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge asking whether
there was "any testimony and/or evidence that Frank Quattrone saw
the grand jury or S.E.C. subpoenas, was sent the subpoenas or was
informed of the list of documents requested in the subpoenas" before
he forwarded the e-mail. 245 After the judge declared a mistrial, jurors
who voted to convict recalled that Quattrone's sophistication allowed
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/csfb/usquattrone5l2O3ind.pdf. Quattrone was charged for for-
warding an e-mail which reminded his subordinates that "if a lawsuit is instituted, our re-
tention policy is suspended ... (since it constitutes the destruction of evidence). We
strongly suggest that before you leave for the holidays, you should catch up on file clean-
ing." Id. 39. Quattrone forwarded the e-mail and endorsed it based on his experience in
prior litigation.
240 United States v. Quattrone, Indictment 45-49, available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/csfb/usquattrone5l203ind.pdf.
241 See Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Quattrone Defends His E-mail, WALL ST. J., Oct.
10, 2003, at Cl.
242 Id.
243 See Joshua Chaffin, Quattrone 'Was Warned of IPO Investigation,' FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2003, at 1; Walter Hamilton, Witness: BankerKnew of Probe, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at Cl.
244 United States v. Quattrone, Indictment 16-44, available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/csfb/usquattrone512O3ind.pdf. In one interchange, one of Quattrone's
colleagues noted "Today, it's administrative housekeeping. In January, it could be im-
proper destruction of evidence." Id. 36. Quattrone cautioned the colleague that he
"shouldn't make jokes like that on email!" Id. 38.
245 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Likelihood of Mistrial Grows in Case of Ex-Banker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24 2003, at Cl.
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them to infer a culpable state of mind because he would have "had all
his fingers on the buttons" and was in a position to "know anything
and everything." 246 Jurors who refused to convict Quattrone ex-
plained that the government's evidence was not strong enough be-
cause it required them "to make a leap " 24 7 in order to arrive at a
conclusion. However, the case may have been even weaker than this
disagreement indicates. When the jurors took their first vote, it was
7-4 in favor of acquittal. 248 After the hung jury, one juror recounted,
"I heard a lot of jurors say if [Quattrone] ... hadn't been a witness, it
would have been 'not guilty' the first day."2 4 9 The apparent problem
with his testimony was that his command over all aspects of business
matters undermined his claims that he was ignorant about the nature
of the government inquiry. 250
The hung jury in Frank Quattrone's first trial is another example
of how the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley federal obstruction statutes encounter
difficulties when employed against an act of anticipatory obstruction.
Quattrone derailed the prosecution's case by claiming incomplete
knowledge of the investigation. 251 This claim nearly won him an ac-
quittal, even though his business sophistication was readily apparent
to the jury252 and numerous e-mails in which he discussed the govern-
ment inquiry were presented as evidence. 253 Both the Quattrone and
Andersen cases show that even when courts allow prosecutions to pro-
ceed against defendants who destroy documents before they have all
the information about a proceeding, juries have difficulty finding the
obstructive intent necessary to convict. Thus, even jurisdictions where
courts have interpreted the statutory language broadly to uphold con-
victions for anticipatory obstruction may still encounter obstacles in
securing guilty verdicts.
IV
THE LEGISLATIvE RECORD
While the legal and practical limitations of prior law are impor-
tant in understanding the significance of § 1519, the crucial source
for courts interpreting the scope of the new Sarbanes-Oxley anti-
246 Andrew Ross Sorkin, QuattroneJuror Says Three Wouldn't Budge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2003, at CIO (quoting juror Kenneth Shook).
247 See Carolyn Said, Mistrial Declared in Quattrone Case: Jury Unable to Reach Unanimity on
All Counts, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2003, at B1 (quoting juror Michael Roman).
248 Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Inside Quattrone Jury Room, Discord Culminates in
Mistrial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at Al.
249 Sorkin, supra note 246, at CIO (quoting juror Mayo Villalona).
250 See Trial of Investment Banker Frank Quattrone Ends in a Mistrial (NPR radio broadcast,
Oct. 24, 2003).
251 See Smith & Scannell, supra note 248, at C1.
252 See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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shredding provision will be the legislative record and drafting of the
statute. This record shows a congressional intent that the statute be
applied broadly, as a new weapon in the federal prosecutors' arsenal
in combating obstruction ofjustice in white-collar criminal cases. This
intent seems to run counter to the dismissive attitudes shown by some
commentators about the provision.254
A. White-Collar Crime Headlines
The first indication from the legislative record of Congress's in-
tent comes from the news that spurred congressional action. While
no one news story can ever independently spur legislative action, the
Sarbanes-Oxley bill was primarily motivated by the collapse of energy-
trading giant Enron and its accounting firm Arthur Andersen. 255 As
members of Congress considered and drafted the measures of the bill,
stories about wrongdoing at Andersen and Enron, particularly the
document shredding, dominated headlines.256 The passage of the
anti-shredding provision can be seen as a direct response to the story
of Arthur Andersen's massive shredding operation on the eve of an
SEC subpoena. 257 David Duncan's widely reported "stop the shred-
ding" e-mail, sent only after Arthur Andersen received a subpoena
from the SEC, reinforced the popular misconception that shredding
is legal until the moment when the actor receives a subpoena and
knows that the documents are being sought for a legal proceeding. 258
Though legally impotent, this hyper-technical defense-"I did not
254 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
255 The record is replete with references to the Enron/Arthur Andersen collapse; one
example is Sen. Leahy's remarks in first introducing § 1519 on the Senate floor. See 148
CONG REC. S1,785-86 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
256 A Pew Center for People and the Press public opinion survey shows that the news
audience reported a steep increase in how closely they followed the stories leading up to
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. The percentage of respondents who claimed to have fol-
lowed stories about "recent business scandals" either "very closely" or "fairly closely" rose
from 34% in December 2001 to 64% in July 2002. News Media's Improved Image Proves Short-
Lived: The Sagging Stock Market's Big Audience, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS
1, Q.2(c) (Aug. 4, 2002), at http://people-press.org/reports/pint.php3?PageID=631.
257 See Perino, supra note 11, at 678 (noting that § 1519 was passed "[w]ith an eye
clearly on the Arthur Andersen document destruction prosecution").
258 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 394 (noting that until the Arthur Andersen case
"many people (including some lawyers) mistakenly believed that if a person destroys docu-
ments.., before a subpoena issues, that person cannot be prosecuted for obstruction under
§ 1503"); Coffee, supra note 69, at A19 (positing that Andersen's shredding was the result
of bad legal advice that shredding non-subpoenaed documents was legal); Michael B. Him-
mel & Christopher S. Porrino, Criminal Law: Document Destruction May Constitute Pre-Sub-
poena Obstruction ofJustice, N.J. L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 32 ("[M]any lawyers do not know . . .
that destruction of documents may be a crime, even before a subpoena is served upon a
company or individual."). For an outdated example of this advice, see MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ
ET AL., GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR CRIME ... A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE CORPORATE COUN-
SELOR 61-62 (1986) (advising, in a section entitled "Response to a Grand Jury Subpoena,"
that "[a]t this stage it is important that counsel stress to the client the need to retain all
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know that shredding those documents was illegal yet"-may have
seeped into the Senate's consciousness as its members crafted and
voted on the Sarbanes-Oxley document destruction provision. 259
B. Statement of Intent
Senator Patrick Leahy, then-Chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary, drafted the obstruction-of-justice provisions 260  of the
Sarbanes-Oxley bill.261 Before the final vote on the Sarbanes-Oxley
bill, Leahy summarized the legislative intent of the new anti-shredding
provisions on the floor of the Senate. Leahy described the state of
preexisting statutes prohibiting document destruction as "a patchwork
that have [sic] been interpreted, often very narrowly, by federal
courts."2 62 He specifically noted § 1512 (b) "make [s] it a crime to per-
suade another person to destroy documents, but not a crime to actu-
ally destroy the same documents yourself."263 Further, he argued that
the Supreme Court's Aguilar holding limited obstruction charges
under § 1503 to those "closely tied to a pending judicial proceed-
ing."2 6 4 According to Leahy, § 1519 was intended to correct the "am-
biguities and technical limitations" of the current state of the federal
obstruction statutes. 265
Leahy noted that the drafters intended the new obstruction stat-
ute to apply broadly to acts of document destruction and be bound
only by an "intent" element and a 'jurisdictional" element. Leahy de-
scribed the "intent" element of § 1519 in detail:
[T]his section would create a new 20-year felony which could be
effectively used in a wide array of cases where a person destroys or
documents" since "[a]ny destruction or secreting of documents after a subpoena is re-
ceived may constitute a criminal offense").
259 This idea may have driven Sen. Leahy to comment that § 1519 had "no technical
requirement . . . that the documents were formally under subpoena." 148 CONG REc.
S1,786 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). This precise language was no
longer included in the statement before the Senate on the final vote, perhaps recognizing
that the subpoena/no-subpoena distinction was not the dividing line between other fed-
eral obstruction statutes, making § 1519 no different than prior law. See 148 CONG. REc.
S7,419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
260 The Sarbanes-Oxley bill added two new obstruction provisions to the federal stat-
utes: § 1519 and § 1520, a provision targeting the destruction of audit records of public
companies. See 18 U.S.C.A. § § 1519-20 (West Supp. 2003).
261 See Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen., to John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice 1 (Aug. 2, 2002) (on file with author).
262 148 CONG. REc. S7,419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
263 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), (c) (2000). This disparity was corrected by a separate
amendment in the Sarbanes-Oxley bill. Congress amended § 1512 to add a new subsection
(c). The provision uses language parallel to § 1512(b) and punishes the person who de-
stroys documents rather than the person who "corruptly persuades" another to destroy
documents. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp. 2003).
264 148 CONG. REc. S7,419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
265 Id.
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creates evidence with the intent to obstruct an investigation or mat-
ter that is, as a factual matter, within the jurisdiction of any federal
agency or any bankruptcy. It also covers acts either in contempla-
tion of or in relation to such matters .... [T]he intent required is
the intent to obstruct, not some level of knowledge about the
agency processes of [sic] the precise nature of the agency of [sic]
court's jurisdiction. This statute is specifically meant not to include
any technical requirement ...to tie the obstructive conduct to a
pending or imminent proceeding or matter by intent or
otherwise.2 6
6
Leahy's statement that Congress drafted the language of the statute in
a manner that avoided a link between the "intent" requirement and
the 'jurisdictional" element, supports the notion that the statute was
drafted in order to prosecute pre-emptive obstructers. The exclusion
of the requirement that the government must prove the defendant's
knowledge about "agency processes," "the precise nature of the . ..
jurisdiction," and "technical requirements" of pending proceedings in
Leahy's statement,26 7 shows a rejection of any requisite link between
the obstructive act and the obstructed proceedings. Leahy's criticism
of the Aguilar decision can also be read as legislative frustration with
such a required link or knowledge of it.268 Leahy's discussion about
the dissatisfaction with the current legal strictures surrounding ob-
struction prosecution, as well as his description of this offense's "in-
tent" element, make clear that the statutory language was intended to
avoid judicially imposed limits on prior federal obstruction statutes. 269
For all of these reasons, Leahy's description of the "intent" element
indicates that Congress drafted the statute with an eye towards prose-
cuting defendants who obstruct an investigation they merely
anticipate.
C. Contemplation
In order to give § 1519 this broader reach and avoid the strictures
of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction provisions, Leahy used language in
the statute unique to the federal obstruction statutes:270 prohibiting
acts taken "in contemplation of or in relation to" federal investiga-
tions. In his statement describing the "intent" element, Leahy made
clear that including the language "in contemplation" broadened the
scope of the anti-shredding provision to encompass the early stages of
criminal conduct.
266 Id. at S7,418-19.
267 See Id.
268 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
269 See Chase, supra note 45, at 742-43 (reaching this conclusion about the legislative
intent).
270 See 18 U.S.C. § § 1501-18 (2000).
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It is also sufficient that the act is done "in contemplation" of or in
relation to a matter or investigation .... [Section 1519] extends to
acts done in contemplation of such federal matters, so that the tim-
ing of the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or investiga-
tion is also not a bar to prosecution. The intent of the provision is
simple; people should not be destroying, altering, or falsifying docu
ments to obstruct any government function. 271
Commentators criticized this language for being undefined, un-
specific, and vague.2 72 One analysis of the "in contemplation" lan-
guage suggested that courts have interpreted a similar phrase in § 152
of the bankruptcy statutes to add a mens rea requirement, so that an
actor needs to be "contemplating" bankruptcy before a court may find
that he fraudulently transferred or concealed property.27 3 If courts
were to follow that logic, they would defy Leahy's description of the
legislative intent of the measure. By twice noting that the statute
"also" prohibit acts taken "in contemplation of or in relation" to fed-
eral investigations within his statement about intent in the congres-
sional record, 274 Leahy made clear that the statutory language was
intended to provide federal prosecutors with an alternative option
when they cannot show that the defendant had specific awareness of
the proceeding he or she is accused of obstructing.275 Thus, using
that statutory language to augment the requirements for the defen-
dant's state of mind contradicts the stated legislative intention to dilute
the "intent" element.
While Leahy's statements regarding the intended scope of the
language are instructive, the "contemplation" language itself also pro-
vides courts a solid textual basis for prohibiting anticipatory obstruc-
tion of justice. The Quattrone and Arthur Andersen cases demonstrate
how this language would, in application, ease the government's bur-
den of proving anticipatory white-collar obstruction. Because "con-
template" signifies a state of mind regarding a future or contingent
event,2 76 it describes a state of mind that may exist earlier than the
271 148 CONG. REC. S7,418-19 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
272 Polkes, supra note 79, at 7 (criticizing the language as "undefined and unspecific,"
and alluding to notice problems that would accompany a vagueness criticism); see also Pat-
rick J. Burke & H. Kirke Snyder, Sarbanes-Oxley's Tough Criminal Penalties Relating to Destruc-
tion of Corporate Communications and Documents, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2003, at
24 ("There are bound to be disputes about how far in advance of a federal inquiry a defen-
dant can be deemed to have 'contemplated' that the government would have interest in
the documents at issue.").
273 Recent Legislation, supra note 12, at 731 (drawing from the bankruptcy statute
analogy to conclude that the "in contemplation of' language of § 1519 "may take in less
conduct than the plain language of the statute would suggest").
274 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
275 See Hamel et al., supra note 16, at 34.
276 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 249 (10th ed. 1993) (defining "con-
template" as "to view as contingent or probable"); 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 811 (2d
2004] 1561
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
required obstructive intent that the Quattrone and Andersen juries
failed to find.277 Further, because "contemplate" denotes a state of
mind that continues over a period of time, 278 juries may be more will-
ing to look at a number of different actions by a defendant to infer
contemplation.2 79 "Contemplate" differs from "intend" because "in-
tend" implies a more fixed state of mind about a particular act.28 0 In
addition, by providing separate mental states for the obstructive act
and the proceeding, § 1519 allows the courts in these cases to differ-
entiate the required mental states a defendant must have towards the
different elements of the offense. Therefore, instead of deliberations
about whether and how Arthur Andersen evinced intent to obstruct
an official proceeding, the inquiry would focus on whether Arthur An-
dersen intentionally destroyed documents and whether the firm "con-
templated" the investigation. Frank Quattrone's claim of incomplete
knowledge about the proceeding would be an even more precarious
defense. Instead of an inquiry into whether Mr. Quattrone intended
to impede an investigation, the focus would be on whether he inten-
tionally destroyed documents while "contemplating" an investigation.
While these cases were not part of Leahy's drafting,281 they are in-
formative examples of how "contemplation" removes obstacles from
the government's path to obtaining convictions for pre-emptive docu-
ment destruction.
ed. 1991) (defining "contemplate" to mean "[t]o have in view, look for, expect, take into
account as a contingency to be provided for")
277 The Andersen jurors' description of looking at the law and looking at the Temple e-
mail and Quattrone's attorney's focus on the word "intent," indicates that the statutory
language is crucial in jury deliberations. See supra notes 231, 242 and accompanying text.
278 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 276, at 249 (defining "con-
template" to mean also "to view or consider with continued attention"); 3 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 276, at 811 (defining "contemplate" as "[t]o look at with continued
attention").
279 The Andersen jurors' dismissal of document-shredding evidence as "circumstantial"
in favor of a "smoking gun" e-mail, and the minority of Quattrone jurors who were willing
to infer culpability, and the refusal of some of them to "make a leap," may signify a reluc-
tance among jurors to infer obstructive intent from a defendant's behavior. See supra notes
210, 213, 247 and accompanying text.
280 Compare supra notes 276 and 278 and accompanying text (defining "contemplate"),
with MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 276, at 608 (defining "intend"
as "to direct the mind on"), and 7 OxoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1073 (2d ed. 1991) (defin-
ing "intend" as "[t]o have in the mind as a fixed purpose").
281 This Note's exploration of the Andersen and Quattrone cases is intended only to
show the confusion that pre-Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction law has caused in the jury room,
not to argue that these cases were considered in the drafting of § 1519. Clearly, the Quat-
trone case took place after the passage of the bill. See Part III.C. The impact of the Arthur
Andersen conviction is more difficult to gauge. The details of the case were being widely
reported, and likely had an impact on the drafting of the bill. See Perino, supra note 11, at
678. However, the conviction was obtained after the provision had been introduced. See
148 CONG REC. S1,785-86 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also
Eichenwald, supra note 205, at Al.
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D. Passage and Signing
Presumably based on Leahy's description of this new statute, the
obstruction statutes were added to the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, which
passed both houses with quick debate and little dissention.282 The
final version of the bill passed 99-0 in the Senate and 423-3 in the
House of Representatives, and was signed into law on July 30, 2002 by
President Bush.283 While the record of the Bush Administration's in-
tent in signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and enacting § 1519 into law is
not as precisely articulated, there are indications that White House
officials shared some of Leahy's concerns about the patchwork of fed-
eral obstruction statutes. Before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
record indicates that the White House was advocating to correct the
problem that § 1512(b) only applied to the individual who persuaded
the shredder, as opposed to the shredder himself.28 4 In congressional
testimony, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff highlighted
this disparity as an obstacle to prosecuting an individual who ob-
structed "an anticipated official proceeding," and relayed a request to
Congress from President Bush "to clarify unambiguously the govern-
ment's ability to prosecute all individuals involved in obstructing jus-
tice." 285 While the record does not reflect the detailed enunciation of
intent contained in Leahy's statements, there are indications that the
White House, in signing and negotiating the bill, was also driven by a
concern about the state of obstruction statutes and a desire to prose-
cute individuals for obstruction undertaken in anticipation of
investigations.
E. Department of Justice Field Guidance: Leahy v. Ashcroft
After the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, Attorney General John Ash-
croft issued a "Field Guidance" report for U.S. Attorneys on imple-
menting new provisions of the bill. 28 6 In the memo, the Attorney
282 See Falvey & Wolfman, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley "rolled
through Congress with eye-popping speed and unanimity"); Moohr, supra note 14, at 952
(minimizing the significance of the criminal provisions of the bill and pointing out that it
was "[e]nacted in haste and out of political expediency... [in] an effort to restore confi-
dence in securities markets in a sagging economy").
283 See Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms into Law: President Says Era of 'False Profits'
is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4; Falvey & Wolfman, supra note 14, at 1.
284 Press Release, White House, Corporate Responsibility Fact Sheet (July 9, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-1.html.
285 Penalties for White Collar Offenses: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime?: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 223-24 (2002)
(statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att'y Gen.); see also News Briefing, White House,
White House Officials Hold Background White House Briefing (July 9, 2002) (explaining the
strictures of Aguilar and § 1512(b) in briefing with reporters).
286 Memorandum from the Att'y Gen. to the Dir. of the FBI, the Dir. of the Exec.
Office of U.S. Att'ys, and all U.S. Att'ys all special-agents-in-charge (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted
in 71 CRIM. L. REP. 585-88 (2002).
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General recognized the limitations of the current obstruction statutes
and noted that § 1519 "explicitly reaches activities by an individual 'in
relation to or contemplation of' any matters [within federal jurisdic-
tion]."2 8 7 Ashcroft's memo continued by linking § 1519 to § 1512:
New Section 1519 should be read in conjunction with the amend-
ment to 18 U.S.C. 1512 [which applied the language of§ 1512(b) to
the person who acts to destroy documents instead of only to the
person who persuades another to do so] . . . which similarly bars
corrupt acts to destroy, alter, mutilate or conceal evidence, in con-
templation of an "official proceeding."28 8
A day after the memo was issued, Leahy sent a critical letter to the
Attorney General in which he described the field guidance as falling
short of fulfilling the congressional intent of Sarbanes-Oxley, and
stated that Congress had passed a "strong law," but that "any law is
only as strong as its enforcement." 28 9 Leahy criticized the contention
that § 1512 and § 1519 should be read "in conjunction" with one
another:
This statement is inaccurate and risks a significant narrowing of the
new crime created in section 1519. Section 1519 ... is plainly writ-
ten to be a new, stand alone felony that imposes broad prohibitions
on evidence tampering. New section 1519 is in no way linked to the
amendment to existing 18 U.S.C. 1512 . . . and the statutory and
judicial limitations on the use of section 1512 simply have no bear-
ing on the intended reach of new section 1519.290
Leahy went on to describe differences between the two statutes. He
first noted that the "official proceeding" requirement in § 1512 does
not apply to § 1519.291 He then emphasized that § 1519 was drafted
in order to avoid the requirement that the defendant know about the
proceeding against him:
[Section] 1519 requires only proof of the defendant's intent to ob-
struct, impede, or influence and not any link to the defendant's
knowledge about the nature of the government's jurisdiction....
The reason for this is simple: establishing this level of intent has
caused serious problems for prosecutors and confusion forjuries in
the past and does not make sense from a policy perspective when
there is an act of evidence tampering. 29 2
287 Id. at 585.
288 Id.
289 Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen., to John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., supra note 44, at
1; see also Leahy Faults Ashcroft Guidance on Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 71 CRAM. L.
REP. 583, 583 (2002) (describing how Leahy "warned that if Justice reads the new law too
narrowly, it could diminish the statute's effectiveness in combating financial fraud").
290 Id. at 2.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 2-3.
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Leahy noted that the effort to dilute the requirement of the defen-
dant's knowledge of the proceeding, was one of the reasons why "cor-
ruptly"-a mental state descriptor included in the language of many
other obstruction statutes-was not included in the language of
§ 1519.293 Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Bryant responded to
Leahy's letter, clarifying that "the guidance was not intended to link
the substantive elements of [§ 1519] . . . with the elements of...
[§ 1512]," but rather to direct prosecutors to "consider both provi-
sions and determine which is more appropriate in the particular fac-
tual situation." 29 4 Leahy's vigorous defense of the anti-shredding law
is yet another indication that § 1519 was drafted with the intent that it
prohibit forms of obstruction not already covered under existing stat-
utes. The Justice Department's response to Leahy could be under-
stood as either a concession or a clarification that it too acknowledges
the two statutes as distinct.
V
AN ExPANsrvE INTERPRETATION OF § 1519
A. Anticipatory Obstruction
This Note argues that Congress designed the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-
shredding provision to venture into a new area of obstruction-of-jus-
tice law enforcement: anticipatory obstruction. To do this, courts
could simply find that § 1519 imposes criminal liability where an actor
intentionally destroys documents with only a general contemplation
of the obstructed proceedings. The government could show that the
actor intended to obstruct justice even if he acted without knowledge
of the specific proceeding he would obstruct at the time of the act.29 5
This reading gives distinct meaning to the unique language of
§ 1519, which imposes liability on those who act "in relation to or con-
templation of' a federal investigation or matter.296 It recognizes
Leahy's statements describing the intent element of the law and his
subsequent efforts to distinguish the offense from the document de-
struction provision of the witness-tampering statute.2 97 This reading
gives § 1519 a distinct place among the panoply of federal obstruction
statutes and rejects an analysis of the provision that renders it wholly
redundant.29 The interpretation offers an alternative to the confus-
293 Id.
294 Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen., 2
(Aug. 19, 2002) (on file with author).
295 The closest articulation of this kind of obstructive intent is expressed in Justice
Scalia's Aguilar dissent: the actor's awareness of a pending proceeding need only be shown
as it pertains to his intent. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
296 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West Supp. 2003); see discussion supra Part 1V.C.
297 See discussion supra Part V.B, E.
298 See supra notes 11-14.
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ing jury instructions under § 1512 which instruct jurors that they do
not need to find that a proceeding was in progress when the obstruc-
tive act took place, but that they do need to find an "intent to obstruct
... an official proceeding." 299 Under this interpretation, the new pro-
vision may make a difference for jurors, like those in recent high-pro-
file obstruction cases, who seem confounded as to whether they may
convict a defendant of obstruction when the defendant's knowledge
about the obstructed proceeding is not clearly provable.300 It ensures
that courts do not reward perpetrators of business crimes for their
prescience by shifting the focus from the actor's mental state regarding
the proceeding to the actor's mental state regarding the obstruction. It
poses a direct and unsettling question to a document shredder: aside
from the investigation you suspected was imminent, what other reason
did you have to destroy those documents? Such a reading of § 1519
compels companies to heed the warning issued by Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney Andrew Weissman upon receiving word of the Arthur Andersen
guilty verdict: "When you expect the police, don't destroy
evidence."30 1
Such a broad reading of the statute does not leave the accused
corporation defenseless, nor does it force corporations to become in-
discriminant warehouses of old documents for fear of possible future
investigations.30 2 In defending against a broadly interpreted anti-
shredding provision, one analysis of § 1519 recommends that a "con-
sistently applied and routinely followed retention policy" could
demonstrate that the corporation that shredded documents "did not
have the specific intent to obstruct justice as required by federal
law."'3 0 3 Clearly, just as an e-mail reminding employees to comply with
a document retention program could be strong evidence a defendant
contemplated a judicial proceeding, evidence of a regularly applied
retention policy could exculpate a defendant. 30 4 Arthur Andersen's
conviction has already been cited as a "cautionary tale" for corpora-
tions to have "a coherent document retention policy that is followed
299 See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
300 See discussion supra Part III.
301 Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Altering Document Led to Andersen Conviction, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, June 19, 2002, at 4 (quoting Assistant U.S. Att'y Andrew Weissmann).
302 Of course, the harm of forcing companies to preserve documents, or electronic
versions of documents, is diminished by new technologies for electronic document storage.
However, storage costs and space limitations are real and legitimate business concerns. See
Chase, supra note 45, at 724.
303 Id. at 758-59.
304 See id. at 759.
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consistenly,"30 5 including an e-mail retention policy.3 0 6 Therefore,
such a broad reading of § 1519 would not be unlimited, as an actor
who destroyed documents as a matter of routine, truly without con-
templating an investigation, would not be held criminally liable.30 7
In addition, this expansive interpretation does not remove all
boundaries to the criminal liability imposed by this new anti-shred-
ding provision. The use of "contemplation" as a separate mental state
that the defendant must have toward the obstructed proceeding will
allow courts to give the term meaning through application. The first
defendant accused of anticipatory obstruction will likely argue that all
wrongdoers take some actions to hide their wrongdoing, and all of
these actions are taken with some "contemplation" of the authorities
who could expose their offense. 30 8 Are all acts of document destruc-
tion now prohibited by § 1519? While commentators wrestle with the
question of what mental state justifies the criminalization of "anticipa-
tory offenses" primarily in the context of inchoate crime,3 0 9 the "con-
305 Adam I. Cohen & David J. Lender, Retaining Documents in Electronic Age: Failing to
Actively Manage Information Can Lead to Adverse Inferences in Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 2002,
at S5; see also Burke & Snyder, supra note 272, at 24 (arguing that because § 1519 looks to
what was "contemplated" by a defendant when documents are destroyed, companies
should adopt some mechanism for evaluating documents' potential value to a future gov-
ernment inquiry).
306 See Angie Fares, Sarbanes-Oxley Guidelines, 36 INFo. MGmT. J., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 17,
17; Giuffra, supra note 39, at 2, 4 (recommending an e-mail retention policy for businesses
who hope to avoid liability).
307 A pre-Aguilar criticism of a court for overreaching under § 1503 used document
destruction to show how a commonplace action could be criminalized by a court imposing
"unheard-of criminal liability for negligent obstruction of justice." Joseph V. DeMarco,
Note, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction,
and the Federal Obstruction ofJustice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 571 (1992). The "contem-
plation" language clearly allows courts to avoid the accusation that § 1519 is imposing crim-
inal liability for negligent document destruction.
308 If a drug user deletes an e-mail from his dealer before he meets him, would that be
document destruction in contemplation of a potential DEA investigation? Some practi-
tioners have already begun to pose hypothetical examples to show how little would be
required to show "contemplation" of an investigation in the corporate setting. See Hamel
et al., supra note 16, at 34 (asking if one employee's e-mail is enough to show contempla-
tion so that a failure to suspend a document retention policy could mean criminal liability
for an entire corporation); Frank C. Razzano, It's the Cover-Up That Will Get You! , 4J. INVEST-
MENT COMPLIANCE 39, 41 (2003) ("[R]eading the statute literally[] ... a person who peri-
odically deletes e-mails from his computer files, with the intent that those files should not
be available for use in any future contemplated government investigation, may be violating
the law, even if no hint of an investigation currently exists.").
309 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 524-25; Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens
Rea and Inchoate Crime, 87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1161-62 (1997) (summarizing
different scholars' approaches toward understanding the mens rea required to justify pun-
ishment of inchoate crime); Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing
Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1109-10 (1992) (arguing against the "modern
theory" subjectivist approach of basing criminal liability of inchoate crime on mental cul-
pability); Robbins, supra note 16, at 3-6 (1989) (exploring the culpable intent that would
be required to punish "double inchoate" crimes).
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templation" language allows courts to avoid these theoretical
quandaries. By simply requiring some evidence to support the infer-
ence that a defendant contemplated the obstructed proceeding, a
court can differentiate between an actor destroying documents in con-
templation of an investigation from one merely completing the of-
fense by covering his tracks. For example, in U.S. v. Quattrone, the
government detailed numerous e-mail discussions with Quattrone
from which his contemplation could be inferred. 310 In U.S. v. Arthur
Andersen, the government identified the day of the audit firm's first
conversation with Enron about the SEC action, which could show
when the corporation began to contemplate government involve-
ment.3 11 Both cases show how a real-world application of the statute
can give meaning to the term "contemplation" so that § 1519 may al-
low juries to infer a document shredder's obstructive intent, but also
so that it does not impose indiscriminate criminal liability in the realm
of pre-proceeding obstruction. Clearly, the meaning of this new term
depends on a wise use of prosecutorial discretion of the initial prose-
cutions of shredding violations.
Finally, this expansion of criminal penalties into the realm of an-
ticipatory obstruction ofjustice follows, or at least does not contradict,
the trend of modern criminal law toward allowing earlier intervention
to punish criminal behavior, so long as culpable intent can be shown.
One commentator described the modern era of criminal law as wit-
nessing "the justice system's focus [shifting] from punishing past
crimes to preventing future violations."312 Commentators have fo-
cused on inchoate crimes, or even "double-inchoate crimes," to evalu-
ate the justifications and fairness of imposing criminal liability early-
on.313 While obstruction of justice is not an inchoate offense, 314 the
310 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
311 Indictment 9, United States v. Arthur Andersen, 2002 WL 32153945 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 14, 2002) (No. 02-121) (citing the date of the meeting when Enron alerted the audit
firm that the SEC had begun their inquiry).
312 Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as Crimi-
nal Justice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429, 1429 (2001); see also Robbins, supra note 16, at 62-63
(describing the development of courts' acceptance of "double inchoate crimes"); Crocker,
supra note 309, at 1059 (labeling the approach toward penalizing inchoate crime based
solely on subjective culpability "the modern theory").
313 See Robbins, supra note 16, at 4-6 (proposing approaches to allow the imposition of
criminal liability for "double inchoate crime"); see also Christopher Slobogin, A Jurispru-
dence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (arguing that preventative punish-
ment should be both consistent with, and proportional to, the dangerousness of the
individual); Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37
ARiz. L. REV. 151, 152-53 (1995) (arguing for a principled basis to restrict criminal liability
for "noncommensurate offenses" in order to avoid the problem of "overcriminalization").
For a critique of the concept of multiple inchoate crimes, see Nick Zimmerman, Attempted
Stalking: An Attempt-to-Almost-Attempt-to-Act, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 219, 247-49 (2000).
314 See Robbins, supra note 16, at 115 (defining inchoate crime as "conduct falling
short of the completed object offense"). However, incomplete obstruction is punished
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issues raised by criminalizing anticipatory document shredding are
similar: in both situations, the culpable act precedes the harm the act
could cause. 315 While this Note does not attempt to resolve precisely
how offenses of preemptive interference with administration ofjustice
fit within the theories that support criminalizing nascent wrongdoing,
it is clear that imposing criminal liability earlier than prior law allows
does not raise questions wholly foreign to criminal law scholars. 31 6
Thus, courts penalizing anticipatory obstruction ofjustice will follow a
general trend toward penalizing wrongdoing earlier in the criminal
story and will not be raising new issues of criminal theory.
B. Constitutional Boundaries
The final question is whether courts can constitutionally give the
anti-shredding provision the reach which Congress intended. Does
the Constitution impose any limits on federal criminal law's reach into
the earliest manifestations of obstructive behavior? Can the govern-
ment constitutionally criminalize obstruction that is undertaken only
with a generalized contemplation of future investigation?
Obstruction statutes have repeatedly withstood constitutional
challenges from defendants who claim that they had no notice that
their actions were proscribed. 317 Defendants who challenge their lack
of notice under a criminal statute often pursue constitutional chal-
lenges under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which requires legisla-
tures to define criminal offenses "with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment."3 18 Courts rebuffed arguments that § 1503 and § 1505 are void
for vagueness, finding that the use of the term "corruptly" limits the
scope of those laws to actors who have notice that their actions are
under the federal statutes. Incomplete obstruction is prohibited in § 1503's proscription
of "endeavors" to obstruct justice; the defendant need not be successful in obstructing
justice. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1994). In fact, some have argued that
this language reaches conduct even earlier than inchoate offenses. Michael E. Tigar, Crime
Talk, Rights Talk, and Double Talk: Thoughts on Reading Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 101, 111 n.72 (1986) (arguing that the "endeavor" language "attaches liability
to conduct that would fall short of an attempt").
315 Clearly, this is assuming that the harm caused by obstruction of justice occurs in
the courtroom or when the government demands the documents rather than the moment
when documents are destroyed. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORv L.J. 1533,
1612 (1997) (describing the harm sought to be prevented by several administrative of-
fenses, including obstruction of justice, as a combination of malum in se and malum prohib-
itum harms).
316 See supra note 313.
317 See Palfin & Prabhu, supra note 10, at 886-87, 900-01.
318 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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proscribed. 319 Courts also relied on the "corruptly persuade" lan-
guage in § 1512 as a limit on the scope of the provision, so as to avoid
invalidating the statute as void for vagueness. 320 The "intent to ob-
struct" element in the obstruction statutes was also used by courts to
reject vagueness challenges. 321
However, one vagueness challenge did succeed in overturning
former National Security Advisor John M. Poindexter's conviction
under § 1505 for lying to Congress during the Iran-Contra affair.322
The D.C. Circuit found that the term "corruptly," which described the
mental state required for violation of § 1505, was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Poindexter's acts since it did not provide adequate
notice that the statute imposed criminal liability on those who lie to
Congress. 323 The Poindexter court distinguished between the transitive
and intransitive use of the term32 4 to find that "corruptly," when used
to modify the manner of an action, would survive constitutional chal-
lenge, while "corruptly" used to describe the motive of the action
would be unconstitutionally vague.325  Congress subsequently
amended the statute to counter the notion that it was unconstitution-
ally vague, 32 6 and other circuits have since rejected attempts to extend
Poindexter to other obstruction statutes. 327 Nevertheless, for the pur-
319 See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding the term
"corruptly" keeps § 1503 within constitutional limits even though the statute "covers a
broad spectrum of conduct" (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 206 (5th Cir.
1979))).
320 United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting vagueness
challenge because § 1512(b) "forbids only persuasion with an improper purpose"); United
States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1997) (differentiating "corruptly" when it is
used as the sole scienter requirement from the "corruptly persuade" language that supple-
ments the specific intent requirements in § 1512(b)); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d
442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that § 1512's use of "corruptly" to describe the persuasion
that is prohibited provides adequate notice of unlawful behavior, so that § 1512 is not
unconstitutionally vague).
321 United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that § 1512's
"intent to obstruct" element ensures that it is "not bereft of scienter requirements" and
thus not void for vagueness).
322 United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 377-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
323 Id. at 379. The Poindexter court was concerned with the prospect that broad defi-
nition of "corruptly" may "criminalize all attempts to 'influence' congressional inquiries-
an absurd result that the Congress could not have intended." Id. at 377-78.
324 Id. at 379.
325 See United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining the
transitive-intransitive distinction).
326 See United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574, 578 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that § 1505
was added to the obstruction statutes to counter the Poindexter decision).
327 See United States v. Church, 11 Fed. App. 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding "cor-
ruptly" not vague as applied in § 1517, which prohibits obstruction of bank investigations
by federal agencies); United States v. Brennick, 908 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (D. Mass. 1995)
(noting that five of the circuit courts that have considered the use of "corruptly" in
§ 7212(a), a tax obstruction law, have upheld the statute). In fact, after deciding
Poindexter, the D.C. Circuit found the term "corruptly" in § 1512(b) to survive a vagueness
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pose of analyzing the new anti-shredding provision, the Poindexter case
serves as an important reminder that federal obstruction statutes can
tread close to the constitutional boundaries for vagueness and failure
to give notice.
In addition, the argument that § 1519 is unconstitutionally vague
is stronger than those made against the other federal obstruction stat-
utes. The statutory language of § 1519 does not limit its reach to ac-
tions undertaken "corruptly."328 The reading advocated by this Note
dilutes the notion of the "intent to obstruct," so that the government
is no longer required to show the defendant's knowledge of the ob-
structed proceeding to prove that he intended to obstruct justice. If
the language "in relation to or contemplation of' describes a state of
mind toward the obstructed investigation, a defendant challenging
the law might argue that intentional document destruction occurring
"in relation to" a federal investigation would eliminate all mens rea
requirements toward the obstructed proceeding. An interpretation
that renders § 1519 "a criminal law that contains no mens rea require-
ment and infringes on constitutionally protected rights" may expose
the statute, not just to a challenge that it is vague as applied to antici-
patory obstruction, but also to facial attack where "vagueness perme-
ates the text of such a law."3 29 Practitioners have already alluded to
these constitutional problems; one argued that in an attempt to rid
§ 1519 of the "nexus" requirement, "Congress may have reached too
far in attempting to prevent document destruction" because without a
nexus requirement defendants may lack fair warning of the scope of
§ 1519, and this "violate [s] some of the fairness concerns alluded to in
Aguilar."330 Another described the breadth of § 1519 and questioned
whether "Congress ... criminalized conduct that it did not intend to
punish."33'
There is support, however, for the argument that the anti-shred-
ding provision's scope is narrow enough to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, when used to criminalize anticipatory obstruction. The same
sources that show how the anti-shredding law can be used to prohibit
pre-emptive document destruction also show how it can provide clear
challenge. See Morrison, 98 F.3d at 630. The arguable vagueness of the term "corruptly"
was dealt another blow when the dissent in Aguilar rejected a vagueness challenge to
§ 1503 by describing the use of "corruptly" in the federal criminal law as having a "long-
standing and well-accepted meaning." United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
328 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West Supp. 2003); see supra note 205 and accompanying text.
329 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999)(citations omitted) (italics
removed).
330 Polkes, supra note 79, at 10 see also Burke & Snyder, supra note 272, at 24 (repeat-
edly referring to the "vagueness" of § 1519's statutory language, though not explicitly rais-
ing the constitutional challenge).
331 Lowell & Arnold, supra note 16, at 226.
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notice to potential violators. The legislative intent in the drafting of
the statute and the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Agui-
lar both support the constitutionality of prohibiting anticipatory
obstruction.
Congress intended the contemplation language in § 1519 to di-
minish the level of knowledge a prosecutor must prove. 33 2 But it does
not completely eliminate a mens rea element from the provision.
Leahy's statements indicate that the "contemplation" language in the
statute was incorporated to ease the prosecutor's burden, so that he or
she would not have to prove the defendant's knowledge about the
obstructed proceedings. 333 However, by using a new and unique
term-"contemplation"-to describe the level of knowledge the de-
fendant must possess toward the obstructed proceeding, § 1519 main-
tains a mens rea element that clearly divides the permissible from the
impermissible. Just as the contemplation language extends liability to
the earliest acts of obstruction, it also protects from liability those who
destroy documents without contemplating the illegality of their
actions.
The reasoning in the Aguilar decision provides some support for
the constitutionality. of prohibiting anticipatory obstruction. While
the Aguilar majority did not have to address the defendant's vagueness
challenge because, it found that the conviction lacked the proper
"nexus," the dissent did have to explain why § 1503 survived the
vagueness challenge. 33 4 Justice Scalia characterized the defendant's
challenge as an argument that the statute "fails to provide sufficient
notice that lying to potential grand jury witnesses in an effort to thwart
a grand jury investigation is proscribed," and briskly rebuffed this ar-
gument.335 He declared that when dealing with the obstruction of
jury proceedings, "any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredi-
ble," and that acts committed with the intent to obstruct the due ad-
ministration of justice are "obviously wrongful." 336 To the dissenting
justices, obstructive intent itself is enough to provide constitutionally
required notice-including the obstructive intent of a defendant who
acts under a mistaken belief about the investigation he impedes.33 7
The Aguilar majority opinion also provides support for the notion that
anticipatory obstruction can be constitutionally criminalized. The ma-
jority expressly refused to base its ruling on constitutional "fair notice"
requirements 33 8 and instead based its holding on the proper construc-
332 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the intent element of § 1519).
333 See supra Part V.C.
334 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 614, 616 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
335 Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337 See discussion supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
338 See discussion supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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tion of § 1503. 3 This decision can be seen as an implicit acknowl-
edgment that, if Congress constructed statutes differently, it could
constitutionally prohibit obstruction where the nexus between the ac-
tion and the proceeding is more tenuous than is required under
§ 1503. In order to follow Aguilar, courts will analyze these new stat-
utes by asking how Congress intended them to be used, rather than
inquiring into constitutional constraints on how they may be used.
340
While the Aguilar majority did not directly address a vagueness chal-
lenge, the reasoning and discussion in this case, involving the most
broadly worded federal obstruction statute, portends a quick fate for
vagueness challenges to all federal obstruction statutes.
CONCLUSION
Courts have not yet faced a case that allows them to consider the
breadth of the new Sarbanes-Oxley anti-shredding provision with re-
spect to the prevention of document destruction. Nevertheless, given
the scope that Congress intended for the measure, courts should al-
low prosecutors to use the statute to prevent and punish acts of "antic-
ipatory obstruction." As long as the government can prove that the
defendant destroyed documents, intended to destroy documents, and
contemplated the obstructed investigation, courts should permit
charges to be brought and convictions to stand for obstructing justice.
By giving § 1519 a broad reach, courts not only give effect to the legis-
lative intent behind Sarbanes-Oxley, but also punish obstruction un-
dertaken by the most sophisticated defendants in the justice system.
339 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
340 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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